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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a man who suddenly experiences severe chest pain,
shortness of breath, and increased sweating. This man is rushed to
an emergency room, where he is diagnosed with coronary artery disease, a condition that constricts the small blood vessels which supply
1
oxygen and blood to the heart and can lead to a heart attack. What
if, with the mere push of a button, a physician could establish an
ideal treatment for this patient, taking into consideration the quality
of various treatment options, as well as the patient’s age, gender,
race, ethnicity, co-morbidities such as diabetes, and a variety of other
factors that are all unique to this patient?

1

See Concise Medical Dictionary, OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE (Elizabeth Martin ed., 8th ed.
2010), http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t60.
e11281 (providing a definition of coronary artery disease); see also Mayo Clinic Staff, Coronary Artery Disease: Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/coronaryartery-disease/DS00064/DSECTION=symptoms.
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Undeniably, there is a growing interest in such personalized med2
icine among both the American public and the federal government.
Unfortunately, such individualized treatment is not currently possible
for heart disease, nor is it available for a variety of other relatively
common health afflictions. A patient who presents in a modern-day
U.S. emergency room with coronary artery disease would likely discover different doctors recommending widely varying treatments.
But these variations are mainly a result of lingering uncertainties regarding the best approach for treating this condition, rather than ef3
forts to provide patients with individualized treatments.
Achieving such individualized and highly effective treatment is an
important underlying goal of clinical comparative effectiveness re4
search (CER), a term which is just beginning to trickle into the voca5
bulary of average Americans. Yet greater personalization of medical
2

3

4

5

See Shara Yurkiewicz, The Prospects for Personalized Medicine, 40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14,
14–15 (2010) (noting that “[t]he federal government has demonstrated its commitment
to personalized medicine” and describing how the direct-to-consumer market for genetic
testing has expanded rapidly in recent years).
See Michael S. Lauer, Comparative Effectiveness Research: The View from the NHLBI, 53 J. AM.
C. CARDIOLOGY 1084, 1084 (2009) (describing regional variations in the practice of medicine); David Haynes, Health Care Research: Finding What Works, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
May 19, 2010, at A12 (indicating that patients in Wisconsin were 107% more likely to
have angioplasty if they lived in Milwaukee rather than La Crosse and 120% more likely
to have heart bypass surgery if they lived in Wausau rather than Madison); see also CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2975, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF
MEDICAL TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE (2007),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-ComparativeEffective
ness.pdf#37 (“Without hard evidence . . . decisions about what treatments to recommend
often depend on the individual experience and judgment of physicians.”); Patrick H.
Conway & Carolyn Clancy, Editorial, Charting a Path from Comparative Effectiveness Funding
to Improved Patient-Centered Health Care, 303 JAMA 985, 986 (2010) (noting that “[t]he challenges and frustrations for clinicians and patients of daily clinical decisions necessarily
made under conditions of uncertainty are self-evident”); Alan M. Garber & Sean R. Tunis,
Does Comparative-Effectiveness Research Threaten Personalized Medicine, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1925, 1926 (2009) (noting that “with too few appropriately designed studies, physicians,
patients, and families have often had little guidance about which patients were most likely
to benefit from a clinical strategy”).
See Garber & Tunis, supra note 3, at 1926 (“Perhaps the most important goal of CER is to
broaden and deepen . . . information [about which patients are most likely to benefit
from a clinical strategy], providing tools for matching medical care much more precisely
to individual patients.”); see also Robert Epstein & J. Russell Teagarden, Comparative Effectiveness and Personalized Medicine: Evolving Together or Apart?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1783, 1786
(2010) (“Comparative effectiveness research can . . . extend the potential applications of
personalized medicine.”); John K. Iglehart, The Political Fight over Comparative Effectiveness
Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1757, 1759 (2010) (quoting the president of Friends of Cancer
Research as saying that it has become “clear that [comparative effectiveness research]
could be a step toward ‘personalized’ medicine”).
See infra Part I.A (providing an array of definitions on what the term “comparative effectiveness” encompasses).
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treatment is actually just one of many benefits that can be derived
from increased use of CER.
Comparative effectiveness research also has the ability to save lives
and generate tremendous savings in the health care system, rendering it a critical “game-changer” of the newly passed U.S. federal
6
health reform law. In fact, Francis Collins, the director of the National Institutes of Health, calls the support for comparative effectiveness research embedded in the Patient Protection and Affordable
7
Care Act its “most significant” component, and CER has been touted
as the new “headwind for the health-care industry” due to its ability to
8
discern which drugs, treatments, and devices work best.
Comparative effectiveness research already plays an important
role in the health care systems of many industrialized nations, includ9
10
11
ing those of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Austral6

7
8
9

Mark McClellan, Dir., Brookings Inst. Engleberg Ctr. for Health Care Reform, Welcome
Address at the Brookings Institution Event: Implementing Comparative Effectiveness Research:
Priorities, Methods, and Impact 6 (June 9, 2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0609_health_care_cer/2009060
9_health_care_cer.pdf [hereinafter Brookings Institution, Implementing Comparative Effectiveness]; see Rachel Saslow, NIH Director Sees Hits and Misses in Health Care, WASH. POST,
Mar. 24, 2010, at A15 (describing an interview with the Director of the National Institutes
of Health in which he states that the “most significant” aspect of the new health care bill
is the inclusion of comparative effectiveness research); see also Alex Nussbaum & Meg Tirrell, Health Care Bill’s Small Detail to Have Big Outcome: $500M Institute to Increase Scrutiny of
Drug Studies, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 28, 2010, at B1 (noting that despite being
tucked into page 1,617 of the new 2,400 page health care law and sparking minimal debate, the section on comparative effectiveness research is perhaps “the most sweeping
change to health care in 45 years”). The article also indicated that comparative effectiveness research would be used to help “pry savings from the [health care] system.” Id.
Saslow, supra note 6, at A15.
Nussbaum & Tirell, supra note 6, at B1.
In the United Kingdom, for instance, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), which is an independent committee of health professionals, academics,
industry and lay representatives, has been established. KALIPSO CHALKIDOU, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVE REVIEW WITHIN THE U.K.’S NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
FOR
HEALTH
AND
CLINICAL
EXPERIENCE
1–2
(2009),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2009/
Jul/Chalkidou/1296_Chalkidou_UK_CER_issue_brief_717.pdf (discussing the composition of NICE). NICE was originally created to “reduce[] unwarranted variation in medical practice,” facilitate quick “diffusion of high-value new technologies,” and ensure that
taxpayers’ funds were invested so as to maximize health benefit. Id. at 1. “NICE committees consider comparative clinical and . . . social values . . . and U.K. and European Union
legislation when making their decisions.” CHALKIDOU, supra at 2. England recently decided to stop considering costs in these decisions. See Ed Silverman, UK’s NICE Loses
Decision-Making
Powers,
PHARMALOT,
(Nov.
2,
2010,
7:36
AM)
http://www.pharmalot.com/2010/11/uks-niceloses-decision-making-powers. A variety of
mechanisms have been undertaken by the U.K. government to ensure compliance with
NICE-issued guidelines. See id. at 2 (“Local purchasers of care . . . are required to fund
newly recommended technologies and hospitals to make them available when requested
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ia. Some CER studies have been undertaken in the United States.
In fact, the state of Oregon has been successfully using CER to pri-

10

11

12

13

by a patient and his or her physician; compliance is increasingly considered as part of
provider accreditation, and a new NHS Constitution makes access to NICE-recommended
treatments a right for everyone in England.”).
France created the National Authority for Health (Haute Autorité de Santé, or HAS) in
2005 “with the goals of optimizing the basket of reimbursable goods and services and
helping health care professionals continuously improve their clinical practice by defining
best-care standards and identifying relevant tools and methods.” LISE ROCHAIX &
BERTRAND XERRI, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, NATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR HEALTH:
FRANCE 1 (2009), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/
Issue%20Brief/2009/Jul/Chalkidou/1295_Rochaix_CER_France_issue_brief_724.pdf.
HAS is an independent public authority with financial independence and a “unique legal
identity.” Id. at 1.
Germany evaluates comparative effectiveness research through its Institute for Quality
and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG). See MONA NASSER & PETER SAWICKI, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, INSTITUTE FOR QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE:
GERMANY, 1 (2009), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/
Issue%20Brief/2009/Jul/Chalkidou/1294_Nasser_CER_Germany_issue_brief_724.pdf
(providing background on IQWiG). The majority of Germans obtain health coverage via
the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) system of sickness funds. Id. at 1. Decisions regarding coverage under this system are made by a Federal Joint Committee, which is comprised of a provider, insurer, and patient representatives. Id. at 2. Established in 2004,
IQWiG functions in an advisory role to review available evidence and develop recommendations regarding the costs and benefits of various health services. Id. at 2. IQWiG
has created processes to allow “public and stakeholder comment” on its “preliminary reports.” Id. at 6. While the involvement of these participants furthers the transparency of
the process, it has also caused “debate, criticisms, and discussion,” and has resulted in
substantial media attention focusing on these reports. Id. at 8. These recommendations
are reviewed by the German Joint Commission, which issues coverage and payment directives. See id. at 1 (affording an explanation of the role of Germany’s Federal Joint Committee). Since German law requires insurance funds to cover medically necessary services, “cost-effectiveness analysis can only be used to exclude a treatment from coverage if at
least one equivalent alternative exists.” Id. at 2.
In Australia, the majority of “prescriptions drugs are subsidized through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).” RUTH LOPERT, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, EVIDENCEBASED DECISION-MAKING WITHIN AUSTRALIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME 1
(2009),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20
Brief/2009/Jul/Chalkidou/1297_Lopert_CER_Australia_issue_brief_724.pdf. Drugs are
recommended for inclusion on this list by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), an independent statutory committee, which considers both the comparative
effectiveness and the comparative cost-effectiveness of the drugs it reviews. Id. at 1–2.
Despite cost-effectiveness considerations, the PBS processes are not considered a costcontainment mechanism but rather a way to ensure the best value for Australian taxpayers’ money and equal access to affordable prescription drugs. Id. at 3. The PBS maintains significant public support, despite some controversial decisions. Id. at 9.
See Richard S. Saver, Health Care Reform’s Wild Card: The Uncertain Effectiveness of Comparative Effectiveness Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (noting that some government agencies, such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, have previously provided support for CER activities, and that some private entities, including
health insurance companies and drug and device companies, have also previously undertaken CER studies).
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oritize services for its Medicaid recipients since the mid-1990s. Yet
the potentially substantial benefits of widespread use of CER have only recently begun to garner significant attention in the United
15
States.
The current buzz in the U.S. media over comparative effectiveness
research perhaps began in earnest on February 17, 2009, when CER
was thrust to center stage as President Obama signed into law the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), “a nast
tionwide effort to . . . transform our economy to compete in the 21
16
century.” The Act included provisions creating jobs and providing
17
relief to working-and middle-class families. Perhaps less well known,
it also set aside a substantial grant of $1.1 billion for comparative ef18
fectiveness research.
Following on the heels of the ARRA, Americans saw the enactment of health care reform on March 23, 2010. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provides additional support
for CER by establishing a new non-governmental organization, the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, whose primary pur-

14

15

16

17
18

See Somnath Saha et al., Giving Teeth to Comparative-Effectiveness Research—The Oregon Experience, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e18(1) (2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/
NEJMp0912938.
See Conway & Clancy, supra note 3, at 985 (“The concept of CE research is not
new . . . [w]hat is new is the recognition of and substantial public support for research
that is essential for delivering care that is consistently patient centered and an important
accelerator for achieving the promise of personalized medicine.”); James M. Stubenrauch, Comparative Effectiveness Research: It Could Change the Way Health Care Decisions Are
Made, AM. J. NURSING, Oct. 2009, at 26, 27 (relaying a quote by the director of the National Institute for Nursing Research that “[c]omparative effectiveness research has garnered increased attention as an area of science that can have a significant impact upon
the future health care of the American people” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The White House, The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act: Jumpstarting Our
Economy and Investing in Our Future (Feb. 17, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/assetts/
documents/Recovery_Act_Overview_2-17.pdf.
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (providing appropriations to reinvigorate the American economy).
See Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, AHRQ and the Recovery Act, U.S.
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (June 2010), http://www.ahrq.gov/fund/
cefarra.htm (elaborating on the funding provided to AHRQ through the ARRA for comparative effectiveness research); see also FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 11 (2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/cerannualrpt.pdf (“The ARRA funding reflects the heightened interest in CER among the nation’s clinicians, patients, policy
makers and researchers and broader recognition of its potential to improve outcomes
that matter to patients, including morbidity, mortality, and quality of life.”).
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pose is to facilitate comparative effectiveness research. These successive, massive grants of federal dollars for CER raise the question,
“What is comparative effectiveness research, and why is the government pouring so much money into it?”
A. What Is Comparative Effectiveness Research?
The definition of CER continues to evolve. Thus, different
sources offer slightly varying definitions of what comparative effectiveness research encompasses. After the enactment of the ARRA,
two different entities—the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research and the Institute of Medicine—were
charged with creating priorities for comparative effectiveness re20
search. Each entity proposed its own definitions of comparative ef21
fectiveness research.
In its report to the President and Congress, the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research defines comparative effectiveness research as follows:
Comparative effectiveness research is the conduct and synthesis of research comparing the benefits and harms of different interventions and
strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat and monitor health conditions in
“real world” settings. The purpose of this research is to improve health
outcomes by developing and disseminating evidence-based information
to patients, clinicians, and other decision-makers, responding to their
expressed needs, about which interventions are most effective for which
patients under specific circumstances.
x To provide this information, comparative effectiveness research
must assess a comprehensive array of health-related outcomes for
diverse patient populations and subgroups.
x Defined interventions compared may include medications, procedures, medical and assistive devices and technologies, diagnostic testing, behavioral change, and delivery system strategies.

19

20

21

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 6301, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119, 727 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e) (indicating provisions for
comparative effectiveness research and establishing the Institute).
See Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research Membership: Recovery Act
Allocates $1.1 Billion for Comparative Effectiveness Research, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/os/cerbios.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2011); see also John K. Iglehart, Prioritizing Comparative-Effectiveness Research—IOM
Recommendations, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325, 325 (2009) (explaining the role of the Institute of Medicine in prioritizing federal goals for CER research).
See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
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x This research necessitates the development, expansion, and use of
a variety of data sources and methods to assess comparative effec22
tiveness and actively disseminate the results.

An alternative definition of comparative effective research has been
proposed by the Institute of Medicine (IOM). According to the IOM,
CER is the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and
monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of care. The purpose of CER is to assist consumers, clinicians, purchasers, and policy
makers to make informed decisions that will improve health care at both
23
the individual and population levels.
24

The IOM notes that “CER can take many forms.” These forms
can include reviews of literature, established databases such as electronic medical records, or prospective registries. They can also include research done through cohort studies and randomized control
25
trials.
Another important definition of CER is found in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). The PPACA defines comparative effectiveness research as follows: “The term[] ‘comparative
clinical effectiveness research’ . . . mean[s] research evaluating and
comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and
benefits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and items.” These
“medical treatments, services, and items” include:
health care interventions, protocols for treatment, care management,
and delivery, procedures, medical devices, diagnostic tools, pharmaceuticals (include drugs and biologicals), integrative health practices, and any
other strategies or items being used in the treatment, management, and
26
diagnosis of, or prevention of illness or injury in, individuals.

The PPACA’s definition of CER indicates that the scope of CER
27
which will be funded by the federal government is quite broad. The
PPACA eliminated the Federal Coordinating Council on Comparative Effectiveness, which was created by the Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and established a new Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to develop and help implement a CER project
22
23

24
25
26
27

FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, supra note 18,
at 5.
INST. OF MED., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH
1 (2009), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2009/
ComparativeEffectivenessResearchPriorities/CER%20report%20brief%2008-13-09.pdf.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119, 727 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e).
Alan M. Garber & Harold C. Sox, Analysis & Commentary: The Role of Costs in Comparative
Effectiveness Research, 29 Health Aff. 1805, 1805 (2010).
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28

agenda. The Institute is charged with assisting patient, physician,
purchaser, and policy makers in healthcare-related decisions by mak29
ing better evidence available to them through CER studies. The Institute’s purpose is to “disseminat[e] . . . research findings with respect to the relative outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and
30
appropriateness of . . . medical treatments, services and items.”
B. Why Is the U.S. Government Interested in Utilizing Comparative
Effectiveness Research Findings?
The new focus on comparative effectiveness clinical research in
the United States stems from a growing recognition that rising American health care costs constitute a significant challenge in the quest
31
for successful health care reform. Proliferating health care services,
increases in the volume and intensity of services, the provision of unnecessary care, professional liability, advances in medical technology,
and an aging population are just some of the reasons cited for the
32
current health care cost crisis. While various strategies have been
33
employed to reduce these costs, better information, obtained
through comparative effectiveness research, regarding the costs and
benefits of health care treatment options has more recently been

28

29
30
31

32

33

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6302 (terminating the Federal Coordinating Council); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301 (establishing the PatientCentered Outcomes Research Institute).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301(a) (specifying the purpose of the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute).
See Shailagh Murray & Lori Montgomery, Affordability Is Major Challenge for Reform—Burden
on Middle Class Is a Top Concern, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2009, at A1 (“Democrats and Republicans alike worry that a [health care] bill intended to address one source of financial
hardship—the skyrocketing cost of health care—could lead to another, in the form of
hefty premiums.”); Karen Davis, Why Health Reform Must Counter the Rising Costs of Health
Insurance
Premiums,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
BLOG
(Aug.
18,
2009),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Blog/Davis_Blog_Aug
ust_09_rev.pdf (“As health reform advanced through congressional committees this
summer, much attention was given to trimming the federal budget cost and slowing the
growth in Medicare outlays. . . . Health system reform will be effective only if the legislation considers the financial well-being of all participants, not just that of the federal government.”).
See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians Be Changed to Accommodate New Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1809, 1819–24 (1992)
(discussing factors which may contribute to escalating health care costs).
See William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strategies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 137, 160 (discussing market responses to rising health care costs).
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touted as the key to reducing health care spending without adversely
34
impacting the quality of health care provided in the United States.
In light of the belief that CER can help to reduce health care
spending, references to cost-effectiveness are noticeably absent from
the PPACA’s CER definition. Cost-effectiveness analysis is a compo35
nent of CER in some other countries. However, largely due to fears
of rationing, cost-effectiveness analysis as a component of CER in the
36
United States is limited in the PPACA.
Cost-effectiveness, which has been defined as “a method . . . to assess the comparative impacts of expenditures on different health in37
terventions,” is actually frequently conflated with CER.
[P]eople confuse cost-effectiveness analysis with [CER] because the denominator of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is often derived directly from the results of a study of . . . comparative effectiveness. If the

34

35

36

37

See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 1–2 (discussing how comparative effectiveness
research may enable our health care system to save money without compromising the
quality of care); Tobias Loddenkemper et al., Fears and Promises of Comparative Effectiveness
Research, 99 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 1311, 1312 (2010) (“CER . . . suggests opportunities for reduced spending when it identifies what is inefficient or ineffective. An additional benefit
would be the avoidance of adverse side effects of unneeded tests and therapies, and the
reduced occurrence of false positive results and their consequences.”); see also Ellen-Marie
Whelan & Sonia Sekhar, Better Health Through Better Information: Comparative Effectiveness
Research Will Help Deliver Better Medical Care, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 29, 2009),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/09/cer_brief.html
(explaining
how
comparative effectiveness could improve the current American health care system, in
which “[i]t’s estimated that one-third of procedures and treatments administered in the
United States have no proven benefit and account for up to $700 billion annually in current spending. Moreover, some of these treatments can have harmful side effects, produce worse health outcomes, and then, as a result, add to the soaring costs of medical
care”).
See Research Insights:
Incorporating Costs into Comparative Effectiveness Research,
ACADEMYHEALTH (Feb. 2009), www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/research
insightscer.pdf (noting a study showing ten industrialized countries explicitly include cost
in CER evaluations). However, England recently decided to stop considering costs in its
healthcare decisions.
See Ed Silverman, UK’s NICE Loses Decision-Making Powers,
PHARMALOT (Nov. 2, 2010, 7:36 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2010/11/uks-niceloses-decision-making-powers.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat 119, 741 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1) (“The Patient-Centered
Outcomes Research Institute . . . shall not develop or employ a dollars-per-quality adjusted life year (or similar measure that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s disability) as a threshold to establish what type of health care is cost effective or
recommended. The Secretary shall not utilize such an adjusted life year (or such a similar measure) as a threshold to determine coverage, reimbursement, or incentive programs under title XVIII.”).
See Garber & Sox, supra note 27, at 1808 (quoting A.M. Garber et al., Theoretical Foundations of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, in COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE (Marthe
R. Gold et al. eds. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining cost-effectiveness
according to the Federal Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine).
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study outcomes and the analysis are expressed in the same units, . . . the
38
two quantities will ordinarily be identical.

The PPACA’s limitation on cost-effectiveness analyses may, at first,
seem incongruous with the desire to use CER to improve the value of
American health care. However, health care experts contend that
these diverging interests are reconciled by the fact that private parties, such as health insurance companies, physician groups, and hospitals, will use the federal government’s CER to conduct their own
cost-analyses and distribute this cost information. By funding CER
that does not contain a cost-effectiveness component, the federal
government can avoid the backlash that would likely stem from directly financing cost-effectiveness analysis while simultaneously facili39
tating such analyses.
A variety of factors suggest that the U.S. government is likely to
seek some way to utilize comparative effectiveness research to bend
the health care cost curve. First and foremost, the fact that substantial savings could be generated by using such information was recent40
ly acknowledged by Peter Orszag, the former head of the Congressional Budget Office and a key player in the passage of Obama’s
41
health reform plan. Other health care and economics experts are
also beginning to tout the manner in which comparative effectiveness
research could help the government achieve savings in publicly
42
funded health care programs.
Furthermore, many other major
world powers have already acknowledged the benefits of CER and integrated such research into their health care systems, suggesting that

38
39

40
41

42

Id.
See id. at 1810; see also Robert Wood Johnson Found., Health Policy Brief, Updated: Comparative Effectiveness Research, HEALTH AFF., http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicy
briefs/brief.php?brief_id=28 (describing how the government and the Patient-Centered
Outcomes Research Institute cannot use a cost-effectiveness measure as a “threshold” for
establishing coverage of health care treatment options, but researchers undertaking federally funded CER can incorporate a cost-effectiveness component in their analysis).
Robert Wood Johnson Found., supra note 39 (acknowledging that comparative effectiveness research could generate tremendous savings for our health care system).
See Key Players: Health Care Reform, PBS NEWSHOUR, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
updates/health/jan-june09/healthprofiles_06-08.html (listing the critical players in the
health reform debates); see also Michael D. Shear & Ed O’Keefe, Orszag to Resign as White
House Budget Director, Source Says, WASH. POST, June 22, 2010, at A4 (indicating that Orszag
announced his resignation from the Office of Management and Budget in June 2010).
See Steven D. Pearson & Peter B. Bach, How Medicare Could Use Comparative Effectiveness
Research in Deciding on New Coverage and Reimbursement, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1796, 1797 (2010)
(noting that “comparative effectiveness research may be able to play a role in Medicare,
particularly if a clear vision can be developed for the program’s use of research data to
help contain costs without restricting access to services”).
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the United States is lagging behind the times on this issue. Finally,
there is growing recognition that health care in the United States is
rationed even when no decision is explicitly made to do so. The suggestion has been put forth that allowing the government to ration
care directly might be more beneficial to the general U.S. population
44
than allowing indirect rationing to continue.
C. Political Opposition to Comparative Effectiveness Research
History has shown that federal “agencies whose central mission is
research on such practical matters as the cost, quality, use and outcomes of health services perennially struggle” in U.S. politics to find
45
support. Since CER seeks to achieve similar goals, it is perhaps not
surprising that certain factions have been strongly opposed to providing federal support for such research. Some sectors of the health
care industry, for instance, “fear that a truly efficient and effective
46
healthcare system would cripple their profit margins.” Other CER
opponents contend that it will create government interference in the
doctor-patient relationship and fail to account for individual patient

43

44

45

46

See sources cited supra notes 9–12 (indicating that countries such as the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, and Australia have all incorporated comparative effectiveness research
into their health care decision making).
See Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at MM38 (discussing how health care is rationed even when no explicit decision is made to do so); see
also Jessica Dunsay Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact of the Federal Age Discrimination Act on the “Hidden” Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 1004–11
(1988) (providing further background on health care rationing).
See Bradford H. Gray et al., AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services Research,
HEALTH AFF. 2 (June 23, 2003), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/
early/2003/06/25/hlthaff.w3.283.full.pdf.
See Joe Flower, Fear and Loathing over the Stimulus Bill, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://www.thehealthcareblog.com/the_health_care_blog/2009/02/fear-and-loathingover-the-stimulus-bill.html#more (discussing apprehensions about funding provided for
comparative effectiveness research in President Obama’s stimulus bill); Sarah Rubenstein, PhRMA Tries to Keep ‘Comparative Effectiveness’ in Check, WSJ HEALTH BLOG (May 20,
2009, 10:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/05/20/phrma-tries-to-keepcomparative-effectiveness-in-check/tab/article/ (discussing methods by which the drug
industry has been pushing back against the use of comparative effectiveness research); see
also Jerry Avorn, Debate About Funding Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 360 NEW. ENG. J.
MED. 1927, 1928 (2009) (“The problem is that comparative studies will be threatening to
makers and sellers of costly goods and services that offer no benefit over existing alternatives.”); Coverage & Access: Supporters, Opponents of Comparative Effectiveness Research ‘Gearing
Up’ To Clash over Planned Efforts, New York Times Reports, KAISERNETWORK.ORG (May 7,
2009), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=58368 (indicating that certain health care stakeholders expressed concerns over the inclusion of
funding in President Obama’s stimulus bill for comparative effectiveness research).
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47

differences in medical decision making. Some argue that treatment
guidelines could be impacted by “corruption and abuse” and that
these guidelines might be unable to keep pace with medical innova48
tion.
Whether the new health reform legislation should include support for comparative effectiveness research was a “fierce debate” in
Congress in the summer of 2009, when rumors were rampant that
comparative effectiveness research would lead to government ration49
ing of health care and “death panels.” During the 2009 legislative
session, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Act was introduced
in the Senate but ultimately did not pass, largely as a result of these
50
various stakeholder concerns. Other attempts have also been made

47

48
49

50

See Iglehart, supra note 20, at 327 (enumerating concerns that some health care stakeholders have regarding the use of comparative effectiveness research); Loddenkemper,
supra note 34, at 1312 (discussing concerns about physicians becoming “gatekeepers” of
health care access and about rationing of care, delays in treatment, and a reduction in
available treatment options); see also JEFFREY BERNSTEIN, U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH
GRP., THE FACTS ABOUT COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 3 (2009), available at
http://www.uspirg.org/home/reports/report-archives/health-care/health-care/the-factsabout-comparative-effectiveness-research (noting that comparative effectiveness research
has recently emerged in the health care reform debate as an area of controversy); Tony
Coelho, A Patient Advocate’s Perspective on Patient-Centered Comparative Effectiveness Research,
29 HEALTH AFF. 1885, 1888 (2010) (discussing how “many Americans still misinterpret
the intent of [comparative effectiveness] research”); Stubenrauch, supra note 15, at 27
(“Despite the clear need for CER and its obvious benefits, it has recently become a matter
of heated debate within the struggle over health care reform. Just as some opponents of
current reform plans have misrepresented a proposal to fund optional end-of-life counseling for Medicare patients as ‘death panels’ that would ‘pull the plug on Grandma,’
they have also tried to raise fears that CER could be used to deny specific treatments to
deserving patients and to ‘ration’ health care.”); Whelan & Sekhar, supra note 34 (“Comparative effectiveness research is now under fire despite its critical importance as objective research. Critics worry about the government’s role in determining best practices.
They assert that the government will use the findings to intrude on patient-provider relationships. They worry that the research will not account for variations in patient health
statuses and backgrounds. And they are concerned that the findings will be used to make
coverage determinations.”).
Alan S. Gerber et al., A National Survey Reveals Public Skepticism About Research-Based Treatment Guidelines, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1882, 1882–83 (2010).
Susan Dentzer, Comparative Effectiveness: Coherent Health Care at Last?, 29 HEALTH AFF.
1756, 1756 (2010). For a more analytical view of the potential harms of Medicare using
comparative effectiveness research to guide its reimbursement decisions, see Anirban Basu & Tomas J. Philipson, The Impact of Comparative Effectiveness Research on Health and Health
Care Spending (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15633, 2010), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15633 (“The main conclusion of our analysis is that
simplistic thinking about the impact of traditionally perceived CER may have adverse effects.”).
See Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Act of 2009, S. 1213, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); See generally Paul Keckley & Barbara B. Frink, Comparative Effectiveness: A Strategic
Perspective on What It Is and What It May Mean for the United States, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCIS.
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to prevent the government from funding comparative effectiveness
51
research, though these efforts have received little attention in the
52
media. Ultimately, support for comparative effectiveness research
was incorporated into the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, but the initiative is said to have been “so controversial . . . that it
spent weeks in surgery before materializing in the final reform pack53
age.”
While CER has already “dodged a barrage of well-coordinated bul54
lets[,] . . . the debate is bound to continue.” Comparative effectiveness research is potentially poised to play a tremendous role in health
55
reform with respect to “bending the health care cost curve.” However, if its use is significantly obstructed by opponents, the ability of
56
health care reform to succeed could be severely undermined.
The U.S. government could choose to harness comparative effectiveness research findings in a variety of ways. The government could
use CER findings to ban outright all U.S. citizens from accessing certain treatment options. Alternatively, the government could use CER
results to ban a certain classification of individuals, such as a specific
racial group or gender, from accessing a given treatment option.

51

52

53
54
55
56

L. 53 (2009) (describing why some stakeholders oppose the use of comparative effectiveness research).
See Avorn, supra note 46, at 1927 (“The proposal to include $1.1 billion for comparativeeffectiveness research (CER) in the federal stimulus package encountered a vigorous and
well-coordinated backlash. The campaign to gut this funding ultimately failed, but the
debate it engendered and the resonance of the opposition’s arguments in both lay and
policy circles reveal much about the issues that will surround such research and its application in the coming years.”).
See Bob Moffit & Julius Chen, Senate Committee Blocks Anti-Rationing Amendments, FOUNDRY:
CONSERVATIVE POL’Y NEWS (July 10, 2009), http://blog.heritage.org/2009/07/10/
senate-committee-blocks-anti-rationing-amendments/ (highlighting that the media has
largely ignored attempts to block funding for comparative effectiveness research).
Iglehart, supra note 4, at 1757.
Avorn, supra note 46, at 1929; see also Iglehart, supra note 4, at 1760 (“[T]he debate over
the role of comparative effectiveness research in US health care is clearly far from over.”).
See Brookings Institution, Implementing Comparative Effectiveness, supra note 6, at 6.
See Consensus Statement on the Critical Importance of Comparative Effectiveness Research, PAC.
BUS. GROUP ON HEALTH (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.pbgh.org/news/pubs/
documents/CER-StatementtoSenate.pdf (providing a public consensus statement on behalf of forty-four organizations representing business, labor, consumers, researchers,
health plans, physicians, nurses, and other providers that “comparative effectiveness research [is] a critical component of health reform” and should be “retained in any reform
legislation”); see also Mark McClellan & Joshua Benner, Comparative Effectiveness Research:
Will It Bend the Health Care Cost Curve and Improve Quality?, in IMPLEMENTING COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH: PRIORITIES, METHODS, AND IMPACT 7, 14 (2009) (indicating
that implementing CER properly may “be challenging, but doing so could enable CER to
play an essential role in achieving the goal of bending the cost curve while improving
health in America”).
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The government could also use CER findings to alter procedural requirements so as to render more difficult obtaining a treatment option that has been deemed less desirable on the basis of CER results.
The government could also deny public funding for certain medical
treatment options on the basis of CER findings.
In the near future, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services is likely to resort to at least some of these means of banning
or limiting access to health care treatment options on the basis of
57
CER results in order to rein in escalating health care costs. Legal
commentators believe that such government rationing of health care
58
will raise constitutional challenges.
Thus, Parts II through IV of this Comment explore whether each
of these potential ways in which the U.S. government may seek to use
comparative effectiveness research findings to ban or limit access to
health treatment options would withstand constitutional challenge.
Part VI considers the relevant procedural due process concerns
raised when the government deprives an individual of a health care
treatment option without adequate procedural protections. Finally,
Part VII explores whether the government could constitutionally use
certificate-of-need standards or licensing requirements to restrict
health care investments by private actors on the basis of CER findings. Ultimately, this Comment affords an in-depth assessment of potential constitutional hurdles to a national health care system that
harnesses comparative effectiveness research findings to ban or limit
access to certain health care treatment options. In light of the major
investments and support provided for CER in recent federal legisla57

58

Health care experts already emphatically advocate for a cost-effectiveness component to
be incorporated into the government’s CER research. See, e.g., Garber & Sox, supra note
27, at 1809 (“[T]he Patient-Center Outcomes Research Institute and other sponsors of
the research should demand that it include data on use and costs, for several reasons.”);
see also Pearson & Bach, supra note 42, at 1797 (“[T]he best way for Medicare to benefit
from the nation’s new investment in comparative effectiveness research is to use it as a
bridge—a conceptual and practical tool to link positive coverage decisions with evidencebased reimbursement levels.”). Note that constitutional challenges to PPACA have already occurred. See, for instance, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). However, at the time this
Comment went to press, the challenges had only focused on the act’s mandate to purchase health care coverage and not the use of CER results.
See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 239, 285–86 (surmising that constitutional challenges would likely be raised if expensive lifesaving medical treatments were rationed by the government); see also Kelli D.
Back, Rationing Health Care: Naturally Unjust?, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 245, 255
(1991) (explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet addressed a case of explicit
health care rationing. Still the issue is alive,” so health care rationing may be subject to
constitutional challenge).
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tion and the growing emphasis on finding ways that the government
can rely on CER findings to help reduce costs in the U.S. health care
59
60
system, this issue is critically relevant to current legal debates.
II.

COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AND THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

In 2009, a bill about using CER findings made its way through the
61
House but ultimately failed to succeed in the Senate. However, CER
research was later a prominent feature of the Senate’s version of
health care reform legislation, known as the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), that was enacted into law after being
62
passed by the House and signed by the President. A detailed look at
the language of the PPACA, as amended by the Health Care and
63
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, reveals explicit language re64
garding how CER findings may be utilized by the U.S. government.
Section 6301(a) of the PPACA prohibits the newly established Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, established to develop
and implement a CER project agenda, from mandating “coverage,
65
reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer.”
Section 6301(a) provides that “[t]he [Department of Health and
Human Services’] Secretary may only use evidence and findings from
research conducted under section 1181 [of the Social Security Act as
59
60

61

62

63
64

65

See supra note 57.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), § 6301, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119, 727 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e) (including provisions for comparative effectiveness research).
See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 1401(a) (2009)
(specifying that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed—(A) to permit [a newly established Comparative Effectiveness Research Commission or the Center for Comparative
Effectiveness Research] to mandate coverage, reimbursement or other policies for any
public or private payer; or (B) as preventing the Secretary [of the Department of Health
and Human Services] from covering the routine costs of clinical care received” under
Medicare, Medicaid, or via participation in a clinical trial); id. (noting that “[n]one of the
reports submitted under this section or research findings disseminated by the Center or
Commission shall be construed as mandates, for payment, coverage, or treatment,” or “to
authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine”).
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e), amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-151, 124 Stat. 1029.
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong., 124 Stat.
1029.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301(a) (setting forth adequate procedures for using comparative effectiveness research findings to render a Medicare coverage determination).
Id.
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amended] to make a determination regarding Title XVIII if such use
is through an iterative and transparent process which includes public
66
comment and considers the effect on subpopulations.” The legislation further specifies that CER findings should not be construed as
permitting the Secretary to deny Medicare coverage for items or ser67
vices “solely” on the basis of such research. The Secretary is also
prohibited from using such findings “in a manner that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of
lower value than extending the life of an individual who is younger,
68
nondisabled, or not terminally ill.” However, the Secretary may utilize such findings when they would help extend the lives of such indi69
viduals.
While this newly enacted health care law specifies some limitations
on the use of comparative effectiveness research findings, the Act
does leave room for the Department of Health and Human Services
to use comparative effectiveness research findings to guide its determinations about Medicare coverage for certain health care treatment
options. The PPACA explicitly states that such changes can occur
through “an iterative and transparent process which includes public
comment and considers the effect on subpopulations” (and as long as
the findings do not value extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or
terminally ill individual less than extending the life of younger, non70
disabled or non-terminally ill individuals). A final rule issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services with new provisions banning or limiting access to health care treatment options on the basis
of comparative effectiveness research findings, even if enacted
through proper administrative procedures, could of course still be
71
challenged on constitutional grounds. As more CER results become

66

67

68
69

70
71

See id. Note that Title XVIII refers to Medicare coverage, which is public health insurance
for the aged and disabled. See Compilation of the Social Security Laws, Title XVIII:
Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/
title18/1800.htm. The PPACA does include a parallel provision for Medicaid.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301(a) (specifying limitations on the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with respect to uses of comparative effectiveness research).
See id.
See id. (specifying permissible uses of comparative effectiveness research). It is perhaps
interesting to note that this language only references how to value “extending” life. The
Act is silent with respect to how the quality of life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill
individual should be valued when weighed against extending the life, or the quality of
life, of an individual who is younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill.
See id.
See, e.g., Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 1312 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (holding that a Postal Service regulation prohibiting solicitation of signatures on
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available, the government may seek to utilize these findings to
72
achieve health care savings. The next sections of this Comment
contemplate the ways in which the U.S. government could attempt to
use new comparative effectiveness research findings to impact access
to health care treatment options. This Comment will also consider
whether those intended uses could withstand constitutional challenge.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENT BANS ON
MEDICAL TREATMENT OPTIONS

The U.S. government has the capacity to use comparative effectiveness research findings directly in a number of ways. One conceivable way is to impose an absolute ban on access to a certain medical
73
treatment option. Such a scenario could unfold if CER results show
a particular medical treatment option is substantially better than a
competing treatment option. For instance, CER findings could reveal that Drug A, which is used to treat leukemia, has markedly better
patient outcomes and fewer side effects than Drug B, a competitor.
While both drugs may be approved by the FDA, the Department of
Health and Human Services could, on the basis of these CER findings, promulgate a rule which would ban all Americans from accessing Drug B. Would such an absolute government ban withstand constitutional challenge?
In order to assess the constitutionality of the government denying
access to certain health care treatment options, the substantive aspects of the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
74
Amendments must be considered. The U.S. Constitution grants and
restricts government power, but does not directly control the activi-

72
73

74

petitions, pools, or surveys on Postal Service property violated the free speech guarantees
of the First Amendment).
See supra note 57.
See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 707–10 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the Glucksberg test for establishing a fundamental right), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
156 (2007) (upholding regulations prohibiting a certain procedure for a partial-birth
abortion).
See Kevin Cole, Federal and State “State Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized
Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 330 (1990) (elaborating on the relationship between constitutional challenges and “state action” required to invoke constitutional protections of the
Due Process Clause).
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75

ties of private individuals or organizations. Thus, a constitutional
claim cannot stand unless the alleged harm stems from government
76
wrongdoing. The state action inquiry occurs before the merits of
77
the constitutional claim are considered.
In this inquiry, courts will examine the specific conduct about
which the plaintiff is complaining and whether the decision making
78
regarding that conduct implicates the government in any way.
Where the government makes a decision to deny an individual access
to a certain health care treatment option, the state action doctrine
79
would clearly be implicated. The next stage of constitutional analysis would proceed differently depending on the type of medical
80
treatment option at issue. In order to explore these differences
more clearly, the next portion of analysis will focus on the following
two common medical treatment options and the constitutional implications of denying access to each of them: new drugs and medical
procedures.
A. Absolute Bans on Drugs
A constitutional challenge could be brought if the U.S. government imposes an absolute ban on certain drugs. This section explains why a constitutional challenge a ban on a drug not yet approved by the Food and Drug Administration is unlikely to succeed.
It also describes why a constitutional challenge to an absolute ban on
a drug approved by the FDA could be more successful.

75

76
77

78
79
80

See Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV.
387, 388 (2003) (noting that “with respect to its individual rights provisions, the Constitution binds only governmental actors and not private individuals”).
See Cole, supra note 74, at 327 (“Purely ‘private’ action cannot violate these provisions.”).
See John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. REV. 569,
578 (2005) (“[T]he state action inquiry occurs prior to, and separate from, the merits of a
constitutional claim.”).
See id. at 577–78 (explaining the basic structure of state action analysis).
See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing when the state action doctrine is
implicated).
See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1753, 1753 (1996) (“Before a new therapeutic drug or medical device can be commercialized in the United States, it must meet the safety and effectiveness requirements
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).”); cf. David A. Grimes, Commentary, Technology Follies: The Uncritical Acceptance of Medical Innovation, 269 JAMA 3030, 3032 (1993)
(“A double standard in tests and treatments prevails. While new medicines must have rigorous proof of efficacy and safety before clinical use, tests and operations do not.”).
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The modern day Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was enacted in
81
1938, giving rise to our current system of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) premarket approval for new drugs that enter the U.S.
82
marketplace. While the Act initially only allowed the FDA to establish that new drugs were safe, the 1962 amendments to the Act led to
the current requirement that new drugs be found not only safe but
also effective in order to be approved by the FDA and permitted to
83
enter the market. Thus, presently, the U.S. government has the
power to forbid individuals from obtaining drugs which do not meet
necessary safety and efficacy standards.
Cases such as Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs
v. von Eschenbach have tested the constitutionality of forbidding access
to new drugs that have not yet met all of the FDA’s safety and efficacy
84
standards for market approval. In Abigail Alliance, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied the test outlined in Wash85
ington v. Glucksberg to determine whether terminally ill patients have
a fundamental right to access experimental drugs that have completed Phase I clinical testing for safety but have not yet been eva86
luated for effectiveness. The court first determined that such a right
could not be considered fundamental, as our nation’s history demon-

81

82
83

84

85

86

See Merrill, supra note 80, at 1761 (noting that the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
was passed after the “Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster” resulted in more than one hundred
Tennessee residents being poisoned by a recklessly produced new drug (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See id. at 1762 (“This was the beginning of the modern system of premarket approval
which now covers practically all drugs . . . .”).
See id. at 1765 (“[T]he Amendments . . . raised the standard that a new drug had to satisfy
by explicitly directing FDA to confirm its effectiveness as well as its safety.”); see also
Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 890–
914 (1996) (providing an overview of modern regulation of drugs by the FDA).
See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 707–10 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the test from Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997), for determining whether a right is fundamental), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1159 (2008).
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (establishing that, in order for
a right to be protected by the Due Process Clause, the right must be a fundamental right
or liberty that is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ . . . and ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed,’” and that a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” must be provided (citations omitted) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325, 326 (1937))).
See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 699 (discussing how Abigail Alliance requested that the
FDA promulgate new regulations to permit the marketing of experimental drugs in certain circumstances after Phase I trials were completed).
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87

strates increasing regulation of drugs. Furthermore, the court determined that the country’s legal traditions of allowing a necessity defense, prohibiting intentional interference with rescue, and recognizing a right of self-defense did not justify creating a constitutional
right for an individual to assume any level of risk with respect to the
88
drugs they ingest. Since the right of access to experimental drugs
was ultimately not deemed fundamental, government restrictions on
89
access to these drugs were subject to mere rational basis review. The
court held that the “FDA’s policy of limiting access to investigational
drugs” that have only completed Phase I testing was “rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including
the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown thera90
91
peutic effects.” The Supreme Court declined certiorari.
This case reveals that the FDA can constitutionally ban access to
drugs that it has not yet approved. This holding is also supported by
United States. v. Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, in which the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California determined that the patients did not have a fundamental right of access to a different drug,
92
medical marijuana. The court opinion cited to Carnohan v. United
93
94
States and Rutherford v. United States, both of which rejected claims
that individuals had substantive due process rights to a drug believed
95
to treat cancer, but unapproved by the FDA.

87

88
89
90
91

92

93
94
95

See id. at 707 (“[C]reating constitutional rights to be free from regulation based solely
upon a prior lack of regulation would undermine much of the modern administrative
state, which, like drug regulation, has increased in scope as changing conditions have
warranted.”).
See id. at 707–10 (discussing why Alliance’s arguments fail to establish the requested right
as fundamental).
See id. at 712 (“Because the Alliance’s claimed right is not fundamental, the Alliance’s
claim of a right of access to experimental drugs is subject only to rational basis scrutiny.”).
Id. at 713.
See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Lets Stand Experimental-Drug Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
2008, at A2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to let stand the circuit court’s determination that the terminally ill do not have a constitutional right to access experimental drugs).
See United States v. Cannabis Cultivator’s Club, No. C 98-00085 CRB, 1999 WL 111893, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1999) (finding no constitutional right to access marijuana for medicinal purposes).
616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining to find a constitutional right for the plaintiff to treat himself with a drug not yet approved by the FDA).
442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979) (holding that patients do not have a constitutional right to
access drugs unapproved by the FDA).
See B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 283–86 (2007) (discussing court cases involving medicinal
marijuana).
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The same District Court ruling in Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative
reached the same conclusion again a few years later in Raich v. Ash96
croft. In Raich, the court rejected patients’ claims to medicinal marijuana, again finding that access to medicinal marijuana did not con97
stitute a fundamental due process right. This determination was
98
upheld by the Ninth Circuit.
These cases show that American courts generally do not believe
that the Constitution provides for a fundamental right of access to a
drug that has not been approved by the FDA, even where the patients
99
requesting the drug are terminally ill. As a result, if the government
decides on the basis of CER findings to impose an absolute ban on
access to a non-FDA-approved drug, a constitutional challenge to this
decision would likely be reviewed by courts under rational basis re100
view. The court would likely uphold the decision.
This review of
the case law shows that a new drug must already be approved by the
FDA as both safe and effective before comparative effectiveness re101
search findings could impact Americans’ access to the drug.

96

97
98

99

100

101

Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act does not violate the Ninth or Tenth Amendments), rev’d on other grounds,
352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), aff’d
th
on remand, 500 F.3d 850 (9 Cir. 2007). This case would later reach the Supreme Court as
Gonzales v. Raich, where the Court addressed whether the federal Controlled Substances
Act, which conflicted with California’s Compassionate Use Act permitting the use of medicinal marijuana, fell within Congress’ commerce powers. However, the issue of whether patients had a substantive due process right to marijuana was never considered by the
Supreme Court; it was first raised at the district court level. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 28–29 (2005) (permitting Congress to ban the use of marijuana even where states
have approved its use for medicinal purposes).
See Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 928 (addressing whether access to medicinal marijuana constitutes a fundamental right).
th
See Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 869 (9 Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s determination that access to medicinal marijuana does not constitute a fundamental right
under the Constitution).
See Linda Katherine Leibfarth, Giving the Terminally Ill Their Due (Process): A Case for Expanded Access to Experimental Drugs Through the Political Process, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1293
(2008) (discussing how the courts have found no fundamental right of access to experimental drugs). But see id. at 1288–90 (noting that the FDA has actually promulgated a
Compassionate Use exemption for terminal illness, though only to access certain drugs
undergoing Phase III trials, and has made efforts to expedite access to drugs to treat
AIDS and other serious illnesses).
See Williamson v. Lee Optical., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (“We cannot say that the
regulation has no rational relation to that objective and therefore is beyond constitutional bounds.”); see also Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779 (describing how, traditionally, rational basis
review involves substantial deference to the government).
See Leibfarth, supra note 99, at 1282 (noting that new drugs must meet the FDA’s safety
and efficacy standards before they can enter the United States marketplace).
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As comparative effectiveness research becomes more widely available, Congress could alter the FDA’s drug approval standards so that
it will only approve a drug to enter the marketplace when comparative effectiveness research shows that it is the safest or most effective
102
of an array of drugs available to treat a given medical condition. Alternatively, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services could promulgate a rule which bans an FDA-approved drug
that is deemed less effective or safe than a competitor on the basis of
CER. A constitutional challenge could be raised in either of these
contexts. However, since no such laws exist today, our courts have
not previously been confronted with a similar challenge. The outcome of such a constitutional challenge is interesting to consider, but
also extremely difficult to predict. Furthermore, it seems far more
likely that the government would seek to discourage use of FDAapproved drugs that have been deemed less safe or effective than
competitors on the basis of CER before they would altogether ban
such drugs. For these reasons, this issue remains beyond the scope of
this Comment.
B. Absolute Bans on Medical Procedures
In contrast to drugs—few of which ever make it to the American
marketplace because they must be found both safe and effective by
the FDA before Americans can access them—medical procedures are
103
“subject to little formal control or regulation.” Medical procedures,
such as surgical techniques, are generally only governed “by guidelines, promulgated by national consensus organizations, which entail
104
neither enforcement nor penalty.” Some informal protocols are also in place to help control medical procedures. These controls consist of “state licensure committees for medical practitioners, the fear
of malpractice liability, physician profile databases, and hospital re105
view boards,” and they “are beset with significant problems.” Thus,
most medical procedures could be affected by a government decision
to ban medical procedures deemed less safe or effective than competitors on the basis of CER results. Most, but not all, government decisions to ban a medical procedure would probably be reviewed by the
102
103

104
105

Medicare and Medicaid could also deny coverage for the drug, but this section is focused
on absolute bans of access, rather than issues of coverage.
Amer S. Ahmed, Note, The Last Twist of the Knife: Encouraging the Regulation of Innovative
Surgical Procedures, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (2005) (analyzing the disparity between administrative regulation of pharmaceuticals and surgical procedures).
Id. at 1530.
Id.
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courts using a mere rational basis standard, a very low threshold, and
106
upheld.
However, the government’s ability to deny access to certain medical procedures on the basis of comparative effectiveness research is
not entirely unrestricted. Medical treatment options which have
been deemed fundamental rights by the courts cannot be easily denied by the federal government, even if comparative effectiveness re107
search findings suggest that they should be denied.
An examination of the case law pertaining to a woman’s right to an abortion
elucidates this idea.
A woman’s right to abortion has its roots in the 1965 Supreme
Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court first ex108
plicitly recognized a constitutionally protected right to privacy. The
Court concluded that a zone of privacy encompasses the rights speci109
fied in the Bill of Rights in order to give them full effect. The Supreme Court further pursued this linkage of privacy rights to familyrelated decision making in Roe v. Wade, where the Supreme Court
held that a woman has a fundamental right to abort her pregnancy
for any reason, up until the “point at which the fetus becomes ‘via110
ble.’”
The Court held that an abortion must be available when
needed to protect a woman’s health, and rested its conclusions on
the substantive due process provision embedded in the Fourteenth
111
Amendment. Roe’s holding supported the notion that the government may be more limited in its ability to deny access to medical
112
treatment options deemed fundamental by the courts.
While elements of Roe, including the trimester framework, were overturned by
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Roe’s essential
holding—that a woman has a right to an abortion during the pre106

107
108

109
110
111
112

See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (“We cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation to that objective and therefore is beyond constitutional
bounds.”); Pettinga, supra note 100, 779.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–56 (1973) (establishing a fundamental right to abortion).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (establishing that “the right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic” and “protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment from infringement by the States”).
See id. at 485 (“The present case . . . concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
See id. at 152–56 (establishing a fundamental right to abortion).
See Shannon L. Pedersen, Comment, When Congress Practices Medicine: How Congressional
Legislation of Medical Judgment May Infringe a Fundamental Right, 24 TOURO L. REV. 791,
808–09 (2008) (discussing the medical treatments that have been recognized by the
courts as fundamental rights, including “contraceptives, abortion, and the right to refuse
medical treatment”).

Mar. 2011]

CER AND HEALTH REFORM

839
113

viability portion of her pregnancy—was upheld in Casey. Thus, Casey left intact the notion that there are limitations on the government’s ability to deny access to medical treatment options deemed
fundamental by the courts.
Government use of comparative effectiveness research to deny
access to medical procedures such as abortion would likely be viewed
by the courts as infringing on fundamental rights protected by the
Constitution’s substantive due process protections. Such government
action is also likely to be subject to strict scrutiny and struck down by
the courts. Thus, Casey suggests that access to medical procedures
which constitute fundamental rights could not be denied by the government on the basis of comparative effectiveness research findings.
However, the courts may allow the government to prohibit certain
means of achieving these fundamental rights, as demonstrated by Gon114
zales v. Carhart.
While the Carhart Court acknowledged that “a
woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State,” the
Court viewed the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act at issue in the case as
“[r]egulations which do no more than create structural mechanisms
by which the State . . . may express profound respect for the life of
the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
115
woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”
Since the Act did not
prohibit the standard dilation and extraction form of abortion, once
the Act was implemented, women would still have some means by
which to obtain a partial-birth abortion; only the intact dilation and
116
extraction form of partial-birth abortions was prohibited.
Since
women still had access to some procedure that would help protect
their fundamental right to an abortion, the Court, despite applying a

113

114

115
116

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Laura J. Tepich, Note,
Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right to Choose, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339,
362 (2008) (providing background on the development of a woman’s right to an abortion in the United States); see generally Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant
Women’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
145 (2010) (describing the evolution of a woman’s right to an abortion in the United
States).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158–66 (2007) (upholding a statute that permitted
one form of partial-birth abortion procedures, intact dilation and extraction, but not
another form of partial-birth abortion procedures, known as standard dilation and extraction).
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 145–46 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846, 877 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 154 (“[I]nterpreting the Act so that it does not prohibit standard
[dilation and extraction] is the most reasonable reading and understanding of its
terms.”).
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heightened form of scrutiny, did not view the Act as an “undue bur117
den from any overbreadth” on women seeking an abortion.
Generally, individual rights deemed fundamental under the Constitution receive extra protection in the courts in the form of strict
118
scrutiny review. Since abortions have been designated a fundamen119
tal right by the courts, the courts must apply a form of heightened
120
scrutiny when the government attempts to interfere with this right.
Yet the Court’s ultimate determination in Carhart serves as a remind121
er that, while fundamental rights are subject to heightened scrutiny,
there may nevertheless be limits on the protections these fundamental rights receive.
The holding of Carhart can be extended to the comparative effectiveness research context. Carhart serves as a reminder that, in at least
some circumstances, it is constitutionally permissible for the government to ban a medical procedure associated with a fundamental
right. This conclusion, in turn, suggests that the government could
ban, on the basis of CER findings, a certain medical procedure that
enables an individual to exercise a fundamental right. The courts
may uphold the government’s decision as long as a compelling inter122
est, narrowly tailored to meet government objectives, can be shown.
Notably, it is difficult to imagine another medical procedure which
the courts would deem to be a fundamental right. Abortion procedures may be sui generis among medical procedures in terms of the
protection that they receive from the courts, meaning a ban on other
117

118

119
120
121
122

Id. at 147; see also David L. Faigman et al., Amicus Brief of Constitutional Law Professors David
L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, et al. in the Case of Gonzales v. Carhart, 34 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 69, 99 (2006) (stating “[t]he undue burden test constitutes a form of heightened judicial scrutiny” and “[t]he right to choose an abortion is a core constitutional
right, which triggers heightened scrutiny” (capitalization in original omitted)).
See Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT.
227, 227 (2006) (discussing how an infringement on fundamental rights triggers strict
scrutiny analysis, which requires the government to show a compelling purpose for its actions as well as that no other, less restrictive alternative is available).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–56 (1973) (establishing a fundamental right to abortion).
See Winkler, supra note 118, at 227 (indicating that strict scrutiny analysis applies in the
context of fundamental rights).
See Faigman et al., supra note 117, at 83 (“[T]he undue burden test remains a form of
strict scrutiny.”).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158–166 (2007) (upholding intact dilation and extraction partial-birth abortion procedures but not standard dilation and extraction, an alternative form of partial birth abortion procedure); see also id. at 157–61 (discussing how
a ban on standard dilation and extraction procedures achieves legitimate governmental
interests, including protecting both “the integrity and ethics of the medical profession”
and unborn life (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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medical procedures would perhaps never be subject to the type of
heightened scrutiny employed to review bans on abortion procedures. Thus, it seems that there are few, if any, constitutional barriers
to government efforts to deny access to a medical procedure on the
basis of CER research findings.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT BANS ON MEDICAL
TREATMENT OPTIONS ON THE BASIS OF RACE, GENDER, OR AGE
This Comment has addressed the constitutional implications of attempts by the U.S. government to use CER results to impose an abso123
lute ban on access to a certain medical treatment option. The next
section of this Comment explores the constitutional effects of banning certain classifications of individuals, such as women, AfricanAmericans, the elderly, or those with disabilities, from accessing a
medical treatment option on the basis of CER findings. For instance,
CER results might show that FDA-approved Drug A has substantially
better patient outcomes and fewer side effects than FDA-approved
Drug B, a competitor, for African-Americans. However, the two
drugs might provide similar patient outcomes and side effects among
Caucasians. On the basis of these CER findings, the government
could choose to promulgate a rule banning all African-Americans
from using Drug B while continuing to permit Caucasians to use both
Drug A and Drug B. State action would clearly be implicated in this
case, since the government would be making a decision to ban a class
of individuals from accessing a certain health care treatment op124
tion.
Thus, the next step in this analysis involves considering the
merits of a constitutional challenge to such a ban.
A. Banning Treatment Options on the Basis of Race
The Federal Coordinating Council (FCC) for Comparative Effectiveness, in a 2009 report to the President and Congress outlining
comparative effectiveness research priorities, indicated that more
studies addressing the needs of individuals often underrepresented in
123

124

See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 707–10 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the Glucksberg test for establishing a fundamental right); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156–68 (upholding regulations prohibiting a
certain procedure for a partial-birth abortion).
See generally Cole, supra note 74 (contrasting federal and state constitutional state action
doctrine); Gardbaum, supra note 75 (discussing applicability of individual constitutional
rights only to state action).
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clinical studies should be an important CER priority for the U.S. government. The FCC indicated that more CER at the sub-group level
125
could facilitate greater personalization of medicine. While the goal
of such specialized research may be to improve treatment options for
these sub-group populations, it is possible that this research could
have unintended consequences. For instance, if studies suggest that
an FDA-approved drug is very safe and highly effective for Caucasians
but that it is substantially less safe and effective for African-Americans,
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
could technically use this information to issue a rule which bans African-Americans from accessing the drug. This section considers the
likely success of a constitutional challenge to such a ban.
The notion of treatment options geared toward certain races first
came to light in 2005, when the Food and Drug Administration approved a heart failure therapy drug called BiDil, which was only intended for use by African-Americans. Controversy surrounded the
announcement; while some geneticists feared that the FDA was “using race as a crude shortcut for genetic typing,” certain prominent
black politicians and scientists “embraced BiDil . . . as a way to redress
126
years of inequality in medical treatment and outcomes.” However,
evidence suggests that the drug might also work in individuals who
are not black, and off-label prescribing to non-blacks allows the
127
drug’s manufacturer to reach these other markets.
In the BiDil situation, the government created an overt racial classification with arguably benign effects on majority racial classifications, since the FDA technically only approved the drugs for blacks
but other racial groups can still obtain access through off-label prescribing. This scenario seems to find a parallel in affirmative action
cases. The appropriate level of scrutiny in such circumstances re125

126

127

See FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, supra note
18, at 6 (“The priority populations specifically include, but are not limited to, racial and
ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities, children, the elderly, and patients with multiple chronic conditions. These groups have been traditionally under-represented in
medical research.”).
Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2005, at C2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/health/24drugs.
html?_r=1&ref=bidil_drug (describing reactions to FDA’s approval of BiDil for blacks); see
also Pamela Sankar & Jonathan Kahn, BiDil: Race Medicine or Race Marketing?, HEALTH
AFF., W5-455 (2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.455v1 (discussing whether the FDA’s approval of BiDil for just one race should be viewed as an advancement or a setback for blacks).
See Sankar & Kahn, supra note 126, at W5-461 (discussing the ways in which BiDil’s manufacturer could reap the benefits of market exclusivity for several years after the drug was
first approved for blacks by the FDA).
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mains subject to litigation. While some Supreme Court cases suggest
strict scrutiny is warranted in parallel affirmative-action circums128
tances, others suggest more of a “strict scrutiny minus” or “strict in
129
theory but not fatal in fact” standard.
The BiDil situation can be
distinguished from typical affirmative action cases because whites and
other races presumably can still access the drug through off-label prescribing. Thus, they probably would not satisfy the requirements for
130
standing to sue, which include “injury in fact.”
But consider what would happen if the BiDil scenario was adjusted
in two ways. Imagine, first, that African-Americans are the only classification of individuals that cannot access the drug. Then imagine
that African-Americans are actually prohibited from accessing the
drug (the drug cannot be obtained via off-label prescribing). It is
theoretically possible that, on the basis of CER findings which suggest
that a medical treatment is safe and effective except when used by
African-Americans, the government could attempt to ban only African-Americans from accessing the drug. The government’s decision
would most likely be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard. This
standard requires that a regulation serve compelling governmental
interests and be essential to those interests. Under this standard the
burden would shift to the government to prove that is has a compelling interest and that the means of achieving this interest is narrowly
tailored so as not to have a disadvantageous effect on a minority
131
group.
The Supreme Court, writing in Korematsu, indicated that
“[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of
132
such restrictions.”
However, if the government is enacting such
regulations as a means to cut down on health care costs, it seems
extraordinarily unlikely that the courts would find this rationale sufficient to constitute “[p]ressing public necessity,” since, in practice,
disadvantaging racial classifications have nearly always been struck

128

129
130
131
132

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287–88 (1978) (addressing, for the
first time, the appropriate level of scrutiny for benign racial classifications); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (finding that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state or local governments, are subject to strict scrutiny).
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1989) (finding that some
race-conscious measures might survive strict scrutiny in the affirmative action context).
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (discussing the three requirements of standing to sue, which include injury in fact, causation, and redressability).
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”).
Id.
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133

down by the courts. Thus, it seems that strong legal safeguards are
available to prevent the federal government from banning only certain minorities from accessing a given medical treatment option.
B. Banning Treatment Options on the Basis of Gender
In its report to the President and Congress, the Federal Coordinating Council highlighted the need for greater representation of
women in clinical trials in an effort to ensure that medical advance134
If CER studies show
ments are responsive to their unique needs.
that a given medical treatment is much safer and more effective for
men than for women, the U.S. federal government could potentially
seek to prohibit only women from accessing these treatments. Such
state action would likely be evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny
test, whereby statutory “classifications by gender must serve important
government objectives and be substantially related to achievement of
135
those objectives” in order to remain constitutionally permissible.
“The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the
136
State.” The state must show an “exceedingly persuasive justification
137
The state cannot use “inherent differences” as
for [the] action.”
138
grounds for a sex-based classification.
Judicial precedent suggests that the court will probably strike
139
down a law based on differences that are mere social constructs.
However, the courts may be willing to uphold a law that benefits wom140
en when CER suggests that the differences are real. Yet it is difficult
133

134

135
136
137
138
139

140

See Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction
of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2002) (“In every
subsequent application of Korematsu’s “rigid scrutiny” . . . the Court has struck down
harmful government racial classifications. As a result, most commentators came to believe that government racial discrimination would never survive strict scrutiny again.”).
But see Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (“We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was
made and when the petitioner violated it.”).
FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, supra note 18,
at 17 (recognizing that the underrepresentation of women in clinical studies “presents a
major challenge in applying the results” of those studies to women).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 533.
See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (striking down a state gender-based statutory
scheme requiring husbands to pay alimony after a divorce but not wives); Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (striking down a gender-based statutory scheme in
which Social Security benefits are paid to a widow and her children if a husband dies, but
which gives such benefits only to the children when the deceased parent is the mother).
Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Comment, Geduldig Reborn: Hibbs as a Success (?) of Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg’s Sex Discrimination Strategy, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 581–82 (2005).
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to imagine how limiting access to medical treatment options would
benefit women. It remains to be seen whether courts would find constitutional a ban on women’s access to a medical treatment option
which is not beneficial to women. The government would probably
seek to justify its actions by indicating that the treatment option is not
sufficiently safe or effective for women. Yet it is unclear if this justification would be “exceedingly persuasive” to the court. Thus, it seems
that some legal safeguards exist to protect women from being categorically denied access to certain medical treatment options on the
basis of CER findings, but this safeguard should perhaps be strengthened.
C. Banning Treatment Options on the Basis of Age
Opponents of comparative effectiveness research have often expressed concern that the results of such research would be used to
141
disadvantage the elderly.
These fears may be warranted, since
courts have generally applied a mere rational basis test when review142
ing laws that are disadvantageous for the elderly. Historically, laws
143
subject to rational basis review have been upheld, though they may
be struck down in rare circumstances if they express animus or pre144
judice toward a particular group. If the government decides to use
comparative effectiveness research findings to deny the elderly access
to certain treatment options, impacted individuals have little option
for recourse on the basis of judicial precedent alone.
Some might argue that protections for the elderly are provided by
explicit language in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
stating that “[t]he Secretary shall not use evidence or findings from
comparative clinical effectiveness research . . . in a manner that treats
extending the life of an elderly . . . individual as of lower value than

141

142

143
144

John Donnelly, Health Policy Brief: Comparative Effectiveness Research, HEALTH AFF., 4–5
(Oct. 8, 2010) available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/
healthpolicybrief_28.pdf (indicating public concerns about using comparative effectiveness research).
See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1976) (applying rational basis review and upholding a mandatory retirement law for state police officers because people
over fifty years of age have neither experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment
nor been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not
truly indicative of their abilities).
See e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (applying rational basis
review to uphold a state regulation).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that a
law subject to rational basis review may be found invalid if the law is driven by prejudice
or animosity).
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extending the life of an individual who is younger.” However, these
protections only relate to “determining coverage, reimbursement, or
146
incentive programs.”
These provisions seem to have a few loopholes. They do not provide guidelines for how the quality of life of an elderly individual
should be valued when weighed against extending the life of or the
quality of life of an individual who is younger, nor do they provide
guidelines regarding government decisions about access to certain
treatment options. The Act seems to allow the government to choose
not to provide financial coverage for a certain treatment option to
anyone while simultaneously making it legal for non-elderly individuals to access the treatment option and illegal for elderly individuals to
access the treatment option. Such a ruling would likely be scrutinized
by the courts using a standard of rational basis review, which means
147
the ruling is likely to be upheld.
Of course, if the courts view the
regulation as being created with animus or prejudice toward the elderly, they will sometimes strike it down, using more of a “rational ba148
sis with bite” standard.
The elderly could potentially be banned
from accessing a certain treatment option on the basis of CER results.
The courts would likely invoke this “rational basis with bite” standard
of review to strike down the statute, as such a scenario would seem to
149
involve prejudice toward the elderly.
However, if the government bans the elderly from accessing a certain FDA-approved drug because CER shows that this drug is significantly less effective among the elderly, the government could argue
that its decision does not involve animus or prejudice toward the elderly. Rather, the government would claim that its decision is
grounded in real differences between the elderly and younger individuals. Such real differences would likely pass the weak rational basis standard that would be applied by the courts, and the ban would
likely be upheld. Since regulations which disadvantage individuals on

145

146
147
148
149

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6301(a), 124 Stat.
119, 740 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1301e-1). For the purposes of the Act, the
life of a disabled person also cannot be treated as having lower value than the life of an
individual who is not disabled. The way in which this provision interacts with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. II
2008), would be an interesting topic for further research and discussion, but it is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
Id.
See supra note 143.
Pettinga, supra note 100, at 780.
Id. at 779–80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the emergence of the “rational basis with bite” standard of review).
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the basis of age historically do not receive any form of heightened
judicial scrutiny, it seems that the government could, guided by CER
findings, successfully prevent access to certain treatment options on
the basis of age.
V. GOVERNMENT ALTERING OF PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO
IMPEDE ACCESS TO CERTAIN MEDICAL TREATMENT OPTIONS
The federal government may indeed be able, constitutionally, to
deny access to drugs and the vast majority of medical procedures, but
such outright denial of access is likely to be viewed by the public un150
favorably and as a rather drastic measure. It seems more likely that
the federal government will attempt to use CER results simply to discourage use of certain medical treatment options that it deems less
safe or effective than competitors. One way in which the government
can seek to discourage use of a given medical treatment option is by
imposing procedural barriers that impede access to that option.
The federal and state governments have, in fact, sought to use a
variety of procedural barriers to impede access to abortion proce151
dures, and an examination of this line of cases illuminates the implications of the government seeking to extend such procedural bar152
These cases
riers to comparative effectiveness research.
demonstrate that the federal government is limited in its ability to use
procedural barriers to impede access to medical treatments asso153
ciated with fundamental rights, but medical treatments that are not
150

151

152

153

See Wendy K. Mariner, Rationing Health Care and the Need for Credible Scarcity: Why Americans
Can’t Say No, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1439, 1442 (1995) (explaining why there is public
mistrust of health care rationing).
See LaShunda R. Lowe, Note, An Inside Look at Partial Birth Abortion, 24 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 327, 342 (1999) (discussing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), in which the Supreme
Court held that states may not make abortions unreasonably difficult to access by erecting
complex procedural barriers); see also M. Lisa Wilson-Clayton & Mark A. Clayton, Two
Steps Forward, One Step Back: McKay v. Bergstedt, 12 WHITTIER L. REV. 439, 454–55 (1991)
(discussing how a patient who wishes to discontinue life-sustaining treatment may have to
first work through a vast “procedural matrix” (quoting McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617,
629 (Nev. 1990))).
See Richard Wasserman, Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (1974) (discussing how some state governments have attempted to use elaborate procedural barriers to discourage abortions).
See Gene Lindsey, The Viability of Parental Abortion Notification and Consent Statutes: Assessing
Fact and Fiction, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 881, 881–82 (1989) (describing how many state statutes
impose parental consent or notice requirements on minor’s seeking abortions); see also
Clyde Moore, Case Note, Hodgson v. Minnesota: The Fog Clears from Parental Notice Laws,
16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 399, 413 (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), upholding forty-eight hour waiting periods
prior to abortion procedures).
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associated with fundamental rights are unlikely to be subject to such
limitations.
If the government seeks to use procedural barriers to impede
access to a medical treatment option associated with a fundamental
right, a claim alleging a violation of substantive due process rights is
likely to be raised. The first element of a substantive due process
154
claim, the state action requirement, would clearly be met. In order
to assess the constitutional merits of such a claim, it may be helpful to
consider the case of Carey v. Population Services International.
In Carey, the Supreme Court held that “where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling
state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those in155
terests.” The Court then struck down a state statute prohibiting distribution of non-medical contraceptives to individuals sixteen years of
age or older, except through licensed pharmacists, on the grounds
that the law was not justified by a sufficiently compelling governmen156
tal interest.
While Carey involved access to contraceptives, a number of cases
relating to abortion also demonstrate that when a state attempts to
prevent access to a fundamental right through additional, unduly
burdensome procedural requirements, the courts generally have not
found the state interest to be narrowly tailored and have struck down
157
these state-imposed requirements as unconstitutional. In Doe v. Bolton, portions of an abortion law in Georgia that sought to regulate
medical procedures were deemed an unconstitutional infringement
158
on substantive due process rights to an abortion.
The Supreme
Court invalidated provisions requiring that abortions be performed
159
in a Joint Commission-accredited hospital, that the abortion be approved by a hospital staff abortion committee, and that the performing physician’s judgment be confirmed by two independent examina-

154

155
156
157
158
159

See Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865,
889 (2007) (discussing how challenges to procedural regulations of abortion remain
largely focused on due process).
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
Id. at 697–99.
See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down overly burdensome procedural requirements for obtaining an abortion).
Id. at 201.
Until 2007, the Joint Commission was known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospital Organizations. See The Joint Commission’s Brand Identity, JOINT COMMISSION,
http://www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/brand.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
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tions of the patient by two other licensed physicians.
The state
claimed that it was imposing these requirements to protect the woman’s health and the potential human life of the unborn child, but the
Court determined that the state’s means of achieving its compelling
161
interests were not narrowly tailored.
Another case in which the Court struck down overly burdensome
procedural regulations of abortions was Akron v. Akron Center for Re162
productive Health (Akron I).
In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated a requirement that abortions performed after the first trimester be performed in a hospital rather than in outpatient facilities,
which were typically less expensive, as well as a twenty-four-hour wait163
ing period before a woman could undergo her abortion. In Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court struck down a state
requirement that a woman obtain consent from her spouse prior to
164
obtaining an abortion. In Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v.
Ashcroft, the Court held that a state could involve a parent in a minor’s abortion decision if it also provided an alternative judicial bypass procedure so that the parental involvement would not amount
165
to a potentially arbitrary and absolute veto.
This holding built on
the Court’s earlier finding that a parental consent requirement was
unconstitutional only if it “unduly burdens the right to seek an abor166
tion.”
The outcome of these cases is applicable to concerns about potential government use of comparative effectiveness research findings. If
comparative effectiveness research findings indicate that certain medical treatment options are less desirable than others on the basis of
quality or safety, the aforementioned cases suggest that, where the
treatment option pertains to a right deemed fundamental by the
courts, the government may be limited in imposing procedural barriers. Of course, given that the Courts have only found an affirmative
right to medical treatment involving contraceptives, abortion, and
167
medical care for prisoners, as well as refusal of medical treatment,

160
161
162
163
164
165

166
167

Bolton, 410 U.S. at 201.
Id. at 187.
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating unduly burdensome abortion-related requirements).
Id. at 452.
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
Planned Parenthood of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490–491 (1983) (noting previous cases declined to allow parental consent to serve as an absolute veto on a minor’s
desire to obtain an abortion).
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976).
See Pedersen, supra note 112, at 808–09 (discussing the medical treatments that have been
recognized by the courts as “constitutionally-protected”).
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the vast majority of medical treatment options for which procedural
barriers are erected would likely be subject to mere rational basis review. While fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny and require the government to show that its action is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest, rational basis review requires the minimum
168
level of scrutiny.
When rational basis review is employed, the burden of proof is on the complainant and that standard requires only
that the government action be “rationally related to a legitimate state
169
interest.” Thus, the government may indeed have substantial flexibility in using procedural barriers to hinder access to medical treatment options unassociated with fundamental rights (which are the
majority of medical treatments) if CER findings suggest these treatment options are inferior to other comparable forms of treatment.
A. Government Restrictions on Financial Assistance for Medical Treatments
There is one potential barrier to treatment in which courts have
fairly consistently upheld government decisions that impede access,
even where a fundamental interest such as abortion is implicated.
170
This unique barrier is restrictions on public subsidies. The relevant
line of cases confirms the notion that the Constitution embodies
171
primarily negative, rather than positive, liberties.
These cases also
indicate that the government may constitutionally use a restriction on
public subsidies to impede access to seemingly any medical treatment
option deemed less desirable on the basis of CER findings, even if
such medical treatment options are considered fundamental rights.
Several cases have raised due process challenges to restrictions on
public subsidies in the context of medical treatment options deemed
172
fundamental, such as abortion. In Harris v. McRae, for instance, the
173
claimants sought to enjoin enforcement of the Hyde Amendment
168

169
170
171

172
173

See Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801,
805–06 (2006) (discussing the differences between strict scrutiny and rational basis review
with respect to due process).
Id. at 806 (emphasis omitted).
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–470 (1977) (holding that there was no constitutional
requirement that the government fund abortions for indigent women).
See Gary A. Winters, Unconstitutional Conditions as “Nonsubsidies”: When Is Deference Inappropriate?, 80 GEO. L.J. 131, 135–36 (1991) (discussing how, under the “negative” theory of
constitutional liberty, government is defined primarily by what it may not do, rather than
by what it may or must do).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing that the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s right to an abortion).
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (Hyde Amendment), Pub. L. No. 111-8, §§ 507–08,
123 Stat. 524, 802–03 (providing that state funds may not be used to fund abortion procedures except if the mother’s life would be endangered were the fetus carried to term or

Mar. 2011]

CER AND HEALTH REFORM

851

on the grounds that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
174
Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that a state participating in Medicaid ought to be obligated on constitutional grounds to fund all
175
medically necessary abortions. The Supreme Court ultimately held
that “the Hyde Amendment does not impinge on the due process li176
berty recognized in [Roe].” The Court noted that the amendment
did not place any governmental obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion but simply encouraged alternative activity deemed in
177
the public interest. The Court added that, despite the fact that Roe
recognized abortion as a fundamental right embedded in the due
process guarantees of the Constitution:
[I]t simply does not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with
it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of
the full range of protected choices . . . . [A]lthough government may not
place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls
178
in the latter category.”

The Supreme Court re-affirmed this holding in subsequent cases.
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, for instance, the Court upheld
provisions of Missouri law barring the use of public employees and
facilities for non-therapeutic abortions, even where the patient paid
179
for the abortion herself.
The Supreme Court re-iterated its previously indicated stance that “the Due Process Clause[] generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which
180
the government itself may not deprive the individual.”
The Su-

174

175
176
177
178
179
180

if the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest and the incident has been promptly reported
to a law enforcement agency). The Hyde Amendment was first enacted in 1977. See Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L.
No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). It is a rider which is attached to the annual
Medicaid appropriations bill each year. See Jennifer Keighley, Health Care Reform and Reproductive Rights: Sex Equality Arguments for Abortion Coverage in a National Plan, 33 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 357, 359 (2010).
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (“The constitutional question . . . is whether
the Hyde Amendment, by denying public funding for certain medically necessary abortions, contravenes the liberty or equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment . . . .”).
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 315.
See id. at 316 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)).
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507–11 (1989).
Id. at 507 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989)).
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preme Court upheld similar financial restrictions in Rust v. Sullivan.
In this case, the Department of Health and Human Services’ practice
of only granting family planning projects funding under Title X to
entities that agreed not to provide information on abortions was chal182
lenged.
The Court noted that “[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of
governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her in183
digency.”
Despite the Court’s seemingly consistent determinations that the
Constitution does not impose an obligation on states to pay the medical expenses of indigents, even with respect to medical treatment options deemed fundamental rights, there is at least one population
that has been granted an affirmative right to health care treatment by
184
the state: prisoners.
When a “special custodial or other relationship” between an individual and the state exists, as occurs when the
state or municipality exercises custody, control, coercion, dominion,
or restraint over an individual, a constitutional duty arises for that
state or municipality to grant a general right to the provision of med185
ical care and treatment by the state. Estelle v. Gamble held that pris186
oners have an affirmative right to such care. When the government
fails to provide health care to prisoners, it acts in violation of the
187
Eighth Amendment.
181

182
183
184

185

186
187

See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (holding that restrictions on use of public
funds for abortion-related services did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution).
See id. at 177–78, 181 (discussing petitioners’ reasons for bringing suit).
Id. at 203 (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 316).
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (holding that the government has an obligation to provide medical care for the incarcerated, as “[a]n inmate must rely on prison
authorities to treat his medical needs”).
See Ralph M. Rivera, Note, The Mentally Ill Offender: A Brighter Tomorrow Through the Eyes of
the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, 19 J.L. & HEALTH 107,
111–12 (2004-05) (discussing how, when the government has a special or custodial relationship with individuals such as prisoners, the government has a constitutional obligation to provide such individuals with necessary medical services).
See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (establishing that prisoners have an affirmative right to medical
care).
See Comment, Actionability of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 533, 561 (1978) (“It is thus well settled that the government has a constitutional duty to provide for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. When the government fails to fulfill this duty it violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment.” (footnotes omitted)). Unfortunately for prisoners, while they technically have an affirmative right to
health care, in reality, this right is difficult to enforce. When a prison patient is treated
negligently or experiences malpractice, the prisoner must prove that there was “deliberate indifference to [his or her] serious medical needs,” which is challenging legal stan-
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These cases indicate that, at least from the substantive due process
perspective, opponents of the use of comparative effectiveness research findings are unlikely to be successful in challenging the government should it choose to use such findings as guidelines for restricting public subsidies for certain forms of treatment. The only limitation on the government if it wishes to restrict access in this
manner might be in a scenario where a prisoner requires a subsidy for
treatment.
While challenges to restrictions on public funding for a certain
medical treatment option will generally prove unsuccessful, an attempt could still be made to challenge such restrictions on Medicare
or Medicaid funding on equal protection grounds. The alleged clas188
sification would be on the basis of wealth. In cases such as San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court has determined that classifications on the basis of wealth do not trigger
189
strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny analysis is also employed in cases that
involve a right deemed by the courts to be fundamental, but as has
been discussed, the Court has determined that U.S. citizens do not
190
have a fundamental right to health care. Thus, the vast majority of
equal protection claims to a certain health care treatment would be
viewed under the rational basis test, the lowest level of judicial scruti191
ny. This minimal level of scrutiny would most likely be applied to
an equal protection challenge of a law which restricts public subsidies
for a health care treatment deemed less safe or effective than competitors on the basis of CER. Since it is not difficult for the government
to overcome this low threshold of judicial scrutiny, the court would
likely uphold most government laws or polices that restrict public

188

189

190
191

dard to meet. Rivera, supra note 186, at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
in practice, this right for prisoners is rather narrowly defined.
See Wendy K. Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection of the Law: The Need for a
New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 353–54 (1986) (discussing the judicial
standard utilized to assess wealth classifications in equal protection cases).
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to apply a
judicial strict scrutiny standard in a case involving a classification on the basis of wealth);
see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519–21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that courts are generally unwilling to apply a strict scrutiny standard to classifications
on the basis of wealth); Back, supra note 58, at 255–56 (providing support for the notion
that courts are generally unwilling to apply the strict scrutiny standard where a wealth
classification is at issue).
See Mariner, supra note 189, at 360 (discussing how the Supreme Court has been reluctant
to categorize health care as a fundamental right).
See Back, supra note 58, at 256–57 (discussing the minimum rationality test for equal protection analysis).
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subsidies for certain health care treatments on the basis of CER findings.
An examination of the case law regarding this issue helps to elucidate how these issues are generally viewed by the courts. In Maher v.
Roe, for instance, the claimants challenged a Connecticut regulation
granting Medicaid benefits for childbirth but not for medically unnecessary abortions, claiming this law violated the Equal Protection
192
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court ultimately
upheld the regulation, stating that the law did not violate the Equal
193
Protection Clause.
The Court determined that the regulation did
not create an undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion
and noted that “this Court has never held that financial need alone
194
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.”
The Court also determined that it was unnecessary for a state to show
a compelling interest in favoring normal childbirth over abortion in
order for the law to be upheld. The fact that the state had at least a
legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth satisfied the
195
Court that the law should be upheld.
As noted previously, the Supreme Court rejected a due process vi196
olation claim in Harris v. McRae.
In this case, the Court also rejected a claim that the federal funding limitations of the Hyde
Amendment constituted a violation of the equal protection compo197
nent of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The Court
noted that the Hyde Amendment, which disproportionately impacted
the poor, was not predicated on a constitutionally suspect classifica198
199
tion.
“[P]overty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”
Thus, the rational basis test was applied, and the court found that the
law was indeed rationally related to a legitimate government interest

192
193
194
195

196

197
198
199

See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 467 (1977).
Id. at 470.
Id. at 471.
See id. at 469–70 (explaining why the state may constitutionally subsidize the costs of
childbirth while declining to subsidize the costs of abortion); see also LYNN D. WARDLE,
THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE: A COMPENDIUM AND CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL COURT
ABORTION CASES 261 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Maher).
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (“Although the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interferences
with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.”).
See id. at 324 (finding the government regulation to withstand equal protection analysis).
See id. at 323 (finding that the poor women impacted by the regulation did not constitute
a suspect class).
Id.
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since “the Hyde Amendment bears a rational relationship to its legi200
timate interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus.”
Despite the general failure of equal protection economic rights
claims in federal courts when alleging a violation of the federal con201
stitutional right to equal protection, those who oppose such funding restrictions on medical treatments deemed fundamental rights
may find success in certain state courts when alleging a violation of a
202
state constitutional right to equal protection.
While not all state
constitutions have explicit equal protection language as provided in
the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, all of the U.S. state
constitutions have been interpreted as requiring equal protection of
the laws. In some states cases, “broad guarantees of individual rights
203
have been interpreted to require equal protection of the laws.” In
other states, “multiple provisions” have been interpreted as “collec204
While some chaltively providing equal protection” of the laws.
lenges to abortion funding restrictions have been successful when alleging a violation of a state constitution’s equal protection guarantee,
it is perhaps worth noting that no state court has found a right to
public funding for abortions when the state does not provide public
205
funding for pregnancy-related services.
A number of recent challenges to such regulations have argued
that funding restrictions on abortions burden equal protection guar206
antees of state constitutions.
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and West Virginia have held that the state government’s refusal to provide funding for abortions while opting to
provide funding for other medical procedures burdens the funda207
mental right to have an abortion as established in Roe. The courts
in these states grounded their decision in the “neutrality doctrine,”
under which, “once the government acts in a particular area, it must
200
201

202

203

204
205
206
207

Id. at 324.
See id. (dismissing a claim that a federal law violated equal protection rights of the U.S.
Constitution); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977) (dismissing a claim that a
state abortion law violated equal protection rights of the U.S. Constitution).
See Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17
LAW & INEQ. 239, 281 (1999) (noting recent state cases alleging violations of equal protection rights).
Caroline M. Krastek, The Alabama Constitution Fails to Provide Either Express or Implied Guarantees of Equality. In re Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172 (Ala. 1999), 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1233, 1244–45
(2000) (footnote omitted) (quoting Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Jeffrey, supra note 203, at 283.
Id.
Id. at 282.
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act in a constitutionally neutral manner.” In the context of public
funding for abortion, these courts concluded that once the state
makes a decision to provide Medicaid funding for pregnancy-related
health care, the state cannot then restrict funding for abortions, as
209
the state would not be acting in a neutral manner.
Oregon has determined that state funding restrictions on abortions constitute a violation of equal protection of Oregon’s constitu210
tion.
The Oregon court considering this issue acknowledged that
Roe protects the right to an abortion. The court determined that
providing Medicaid funding for abortions only for women who required the abortion for medical reasons was a form of discrimination
that required the court to weigh the harm to individuals affected by
211
the state action against the state’s justification.
Upon implementing this balancing test, the Oregon court concluded that the state’s
justification, which included cost savings and safeguarding potential
life, did not outweigh the potentially harmful effects to women’s
212
health. Thus, the court determined that state funding restrictions
on abortions violated the Oregon Constitution’s Equal Protection
213
Clause.
However, four states—Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania—have held that a state government’s abortion funding
restrictions do not burden the fundamental right to have an abor214
tion. These courts applied mere rational basis review in determin215
ing whether to uphold the state’s abortion funding restrictions.
They determined that the state interests in “protecting potential life,
promoting childbirth, and promoting infant health” afforded suffi216
cient justification for the states’ restrictions. These courts also concluded that their respective states’ restrictions were indeed “rationally
217
related” to these objectives.
These cases suggest that the federal government cannot generally
be prevented on substantive due process grounds or equal protection
grounds from restricting public subsidies for medical treatment options based on CER findings. However, opponents of such funding
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id. at 283.
Id.
See id. at 282 (discussing the unique stance adopted by the Oregon courts).
Id.
Id. 285–86.
Id.
Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 286–87.
Id.
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restrictions may have success in challenging state-initiated funding restrictions, at least with respect to medical treatment options deemed
fundamental rights, on the grounds that such restrictions violate
equal protection provisions of a given state’s constitution.
Additionally, opponents of government funding restrictions based
on CER findings can undoubtedly use to their advantage any restrictions that, in some manner, also create classifications on the basis of
race or gender. For instance, acquired immune deficiency syndrome
218
(AIDS) disproportionately impacts the black community.
If the
government decides, on the basis of comparative effectiveness research findings, to stop providing reimbursement through Medicaid
or Medicare for a particular AIDS treatment, an equal protection
claim could be brought on the grounds that the decision makes a
classification based not only on wealth but also on race. In light of
the indirect racial classification associated with the direct classification based on wealth, an argument could be advanced that the government’s decision to restrict public subsidies for this treatment op219
tion should be subject to the strict scrutiny standard.
The courts
would have to find the government’s reasoning for this classification
to be compelling and the means of achieving this goal to be “narrowly tailored” to the government’s legitimate interest, which is a very
220
high burden for the government. The government would probably
have to argue that its interest pertained to safety, effectiveness, or saving money. It is difficult to say with certainty whether the courts
would consider these interests to be sufficiently compelling and
whether the government could narrowly tailor its means of achieving
these interests, but, historically, the government has very rarely been
able to meet the burden of proof required in strict scrutiny cases.
218

219

220

See Fighting HIV Among African Americans: A Heightened National Response, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
(2007), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/aa/
resources/factsheets/pdf/AA_response_media_fact.pdf (stating that while blacks account
for approximately 13% of the U.S. population, they account for roughly half of the
people who suffer from HIV/AIDS).
See Michael A. Helfand, How the Diversity Rationale Lays the Groundwork for New Discrimination: Examining the Trajectory of Equal Protection Doctrine, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607,
618–19 (2009) (stating that a party does need not demonstrate “invidious discriminatory
intent against a racial class” to “trigger strict scrutiny”); see also Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that “an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including . . . that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1267, 1268 (2007) (describing the judicial strict scrutiny standard).
See Roozbeh B. Baker, Balancing Competing Priorities: Affirmative Action in the United States
and Canada, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 527, 530–32 (2009) (discussing the rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny standards for equal protection
claims).

858

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:3

Thus, courts are less likely to uphold a government regulation prohibiting public subsidies for medical treatments that disproportionately
impact a certain racial group or suspect class.
Presumably, a heightened scrutiny standard of intermediate scrutiny, which applies to regulations that discriminate on the basis of
221
gender, would also apply to government restrictions on public subsidies that disproportionately affect one gender. However, in practice, courts have declined to apply a heightened intermediate scrutiny
standard in equal protection claims in at least one area of medical
222
treatment: abortion. It remains unclear whether there is a unique
aspect of the abortion context that warrants this diversion from general equal protection analysis or whether such holdings signal the
courts’ reluctance, more broadly, to view government determinations
about public subsidies for medical treatment options under heightened forms of scrutiny.
VI.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CONCERNS

A new government rule that deprives an individual of certain
health benefits without appropriate procedures, as required by the
procedural due process guarantees of the Constitution, may also be
found unconstitutional. In Perry v. Sindermann, the Court found that
individuals deprived of liberty or property are entitled to certain due
223
process procedural protections. If a U.S. citizen has regularly had a
certain treatment subsidized by Medicare or Medicaid and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services promulgates a
rule prohibiting future access to that treatment, the affected individual could attempt to claim a deprivation of property.
If a court agrees that such a rule deprives the individual of liberty
or property interests, the entitlement threshold for procedural due
process is met, and the court must establish what process is due or,
rather, what procedural protections must be afforded to protect the

221

222

223

See id. at 530 (“Courts review legislation that classifies people on the basis of gender . . . for the purposes of treating them differently under the intermediate scrutiny
test.”).
See Mary Catherine Wilcox, Why the Equal Protection Clause Cannot “Fix” Abortion Law, 7 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 307, 313–14 (2008) (“The Court has refused to apply intermediate scrutiny
in cases of restrictions on public funding of abortion and abortion clinic regulations, repeatedly holding that such restrictions and regulations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 547–48 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding a statutory and regulatory scheme covering abortion to be gender-neutral
on its face and thus not subject to intermediate scrutiny).
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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224

individual’s interests.
The Mathews v. Eldridge “balancing test” will
then be applied. This test considers three distinct factors: (1) “the
private interest . . . affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional . . . procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
225
. . . procedural requirement would entail.”
Goldberg v. Kelly established that the Procedural Due Process
Clause requires an evidentiary hearing before the termination of cer226
tain benefits, such as welfare benefits.
However, the Court in Mathews found that an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of social
security disability benefit payments was not required by the Constitu227
tion’s Due Process Clause.
The Court in Mathews distinguished
Goldberg by noting that the entitlement decision in Mathews was derived from the physician, who could provide unbiased medical reports and communicate effectively, rather than through the individual, as was the case in Goldberg. If the government issues new rules,
based on CER findings, which leave the determination of whether
someone is eligible for a given treatment in the hands of a physician,
Mathews suggests that a physician’s decision that the patient no longer requires the treatment may be upheld by the courts; no further
procedural protections need be afforded to protect the individual’s
interests.
However, decisions by the government to exclude certain categories of individuals, on the basis of CER findings, from access to health
care treatment options would perhaps be more similar to the scenario in Heckler v. Campbell, in which medical-vocational guidelines were
promulgated to help systematically determine an individual’s capacity
for work in the national economy once the applicant’s age, work experience, education, and physical condition were established. The
Supreme Court upheld the issuance and use of the medicalvocational guidelines in Heckler, since the determination of whether
jobs existed for a particular claimant was not unique to each clai228
mant.
224
225
226
227
228

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
Id. at 335.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1970).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 339–40.
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468 (1983) (“To require the Secretary to relitigate the
existence of jobs in the national economy at each hearing would hinder needlessly an already overburdened agency. We conclude that the Secretary [of the Department of
Health and Human Services]’s use of medical-vocational guidelines does not conflict with
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Similarly, the government might be able to argue that CER findings clearly show that a certain treatment never works for some category of individuals, such as all individuals over age sixty-five. The
government could then issue guidelines specifying that individuals
over age sixty-five cannot have access to the treatment, and the court
might be willing to uphold the guidelines. The court would presumably uphold the guidelines on the theory that a unique hearing need
not be held for each individual over age sixty-five who wishes to relitigate this issue where the scientific evidence is clear-cut.
However, regulations that incorporate general guidelines are not
always upheld. The Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Zerbly, for instance,
overturned the Social Security Administration’s reliance on children’s disability regulations to deny, without an adjudicatory hearing,
benefits to a child claimant under a Supplemental Security Income
program. The Court found that the guidelines did not sufficiently
account for all the conditions that could prevent a child from under229
taking normal activities.
This case suggests that courts may overturn government guidelines that do not sufficiently account for all of
the variables that should factor into whether an individual may have
access to a given treatment.
VII.

GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE AND PRIVATE ACTORS

The aforementioned scenarios pertain to direct government regulations to deny access or render more difficult to obtain certain medical treatment options on the basis of CER findings. Analysis of the
case law suggests that such governmental action will generally be constitutionally permissible. However, the question remains whether
there are any constitutional limitations on government efforts to influence private actors to utilize CER findings to help reduce health
care costs. The next portion of this Comment will explore this question in the context of government restrictions on health care invest230
ments by private entities and health care licensing mandates.

229
230

the statute, nor can we say on the record before us that they are arbitrary and capricious.”).
Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 540–41 (1990).
Ideas for the general issues to be discussed in this portion of this Comment were drawn
substantially from James F. Blumstein’s Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal,
and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1386–90 (1981) (discussing restrictions on the
use of private funds, including Certificate of Need (CON) laws and licensing requirements).
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A. Government Restrictions on Health Care Investments by Private Entities
In an effort to control health care costs and render more equitable distribution of health care resources, many states at one point
adopted Certificate of Need (CON) legislation, mandated by Congress in the National Health Planning and Resources Development
231
Act (NHPRDA) of 1974. Under this Act, when a health care facility
wished to begin providing a new service that would entail acquiring
medical equipment exceeding $400,000, capital expenditures exceeding $600,000 (indexed for inflation), or certain other particularly
232
costly endeavors, the facility had to request a CON statement. Such
a statement, issued by a state agency, served as a formal acknowledgement by the state that the additional service or equipment was
233
“needed.”
The NHPRDA was repealed fewer than ten years after it was
234
enacted. As a result, the national CON law requirements no longer
exist. However, a number of states continue to manage their own
CON law programs, though CON law requirements are certainly less
common than they once were. State governments could seek to utilize certificate-of-need requests as a means of limiting certain services
within private facilities that are deemed less desirable on the basis
CER findings. Affected individuals could bring suits alleging violations of their due process or equal protection rights. However, the
relevant case law suggests that such restrictions would most likely pass
constitutional muster on both due process and equal protection
235
grounds.
For instance, in Madarang v. Bermudes, a group of dentists brought
a suit alleging a violation of their substantive due process rights to
236
protest a CON law prohibiting them from building a dental clinic.
Acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court’s pattern of upholding eco231

232

233
234

235

236

See Lowell M. Zeta, Note, Fundamental First Steps Along the Road to Health Care Reform, 41
CREIGHTON L. REV. 727, 748 (2008) (discussing the impact of CON regulations on health
care costs); see also Blumstein, supra note 231, at 1386 (discussing provider investment and
revenue restrictions).
See Roberta M. Roos, Note, Certificate of Need for Health Care Facilities: A Time for ReExamination, 7 PACE L. REV. 491, 496–503 (1987) (discussing restrictions and requirements under CON laws).
Id. at 491.
See Gerard R. Coulet, Certificate-of-Need over Hospitals in Rhode Island: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 127 (2010) (“[R]eform legislation . . . lasted for
only nine years before it was repealed.”).
See Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251, 253–54 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding the CON
regulation on equal protection, procedural due process, and substantive due process
grounds).
See id. at 252–53 (applying Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis).

862

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:3

nomic regulations, the court of appeals determined that the CON law
237
did not constitute a violation of substantive due process. The court
of appeals also concluded that the law satisfied the applicable rational
basis test, as “the Commonwealth [had] a legitimate interest in preventing the establishment of unneeded facilities,” and “the CON reg238
ulations [were] rationally related to” that end. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey upheld the constitutionality of the state’s CON laws on
239
similar grounds in In re Certificate of Need Granted to the Harborage.
These cases suggest that if states attempt to make use of CER research
through their CON requirements, lawsuits by affected individuals alleging violations of their substantive due process or equal protection
rights are unlikely to succeed.
B. The Government, Private Actors, and Licensing Requirements
Constitutional challenges have previously been brought against
government licensing requirements. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
the plaintiff alleged that a state act affirmatively facilitated, encour240
aged, or authorized private discrimination.
The Court held that
state alcohol licensing of a private club that refused to serve black
guests does not constitute sufficient state action to render such licensing a violation of Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against dis241
crimination. The Court noted that the distinction between private
and public entities would become meaningless if the Fourteenth
Amendment was held to apply to a private entity whenever such an
entity received any sort of benefit or service from the state or was sub242
ject to any state regulation.

237
238

239

240
241
242

See id. at 253–54 (establishing that there was no violation of substantive or procedural due
process).
See id. at 253; Robert M. Anderson, The Judiciary’s Inability to Strike Down Healthcare Service
Certificate of Need Laws Through Economic Substantive Due Process: A Call for Legislative Action,
2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 703, 725–28 (2008) (quoting Madarang, 889 F.2d at 253).
See In re Certificate of Need Granted to the Harborage, 693 A.2d 133, 146 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997) (“[T]he administrative regulation challenged on this appeal is rationally
related to the legislative goal, and we will not declare it unconstitutional.”).
See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1972) (setting forth the plaintiff’s
allegations).
See id. at 178–79 (holding that the state alcohol license of a private club which discriminates against its members does not constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See id. at 173 (“The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by a[] . . . private
entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any
sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any
degree whatever. . . . [s]uch a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between
private as distinguished from state conduct . . . .”).
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Government licensing can be used in the medical context to discourage a particular activity or use of a particular type of provider
deemed less beneficial on the basis of CER results. For instance, if
CER results show that deliveries are more successful when performed
243
by a physician rather than a midwife, the government could promulgate a rule which says that it is unlawful for deliveries to be overseen by anyone other than a physician (except, perhaps, in exceptional circumstances). At some point, CER findings may indicate that
the ability to exercise a certain fundamental right, such as the right to
an abortion, is best done in a certain facility, such as a hospital. The
relevant case law suggests that, so long as the government can show it
has a compelling interest and has narrowly tailored its means of
achieving that interest, licensing restrictions that prohibit other facili244
ties from providing abortion services could potentially be upheld.
Lawsuits alleging violations of substantive due process may not be
245
brought against private individuals unless state action is implicated.
Yet, echoing the Moose Lodge holding, hospitals generally may not be
deemed state actors merely because they receive Medicare and Medicaid funds and are subject to state regulations, such as licensing re246
quirements.
Similarly, nursing homes cannot be deemed state actors merely because they receive funding from the state and are
247
subject to state regulations. Health care facilities that received HillBurton funds are also not automatically deemed state actors on that
248
basis.

243
244
245
246

247

248

See Lange-Kessler v. Dep’t of Educ., 109 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that patients do not have a constitutional right to access unlicensed providers).
See supra Part III.B and note 122.
See Julie K. Brown, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561,
561 (2008).
See Wheat v. Mass, 994 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1993) (establishing that the hospital “is not
a state actor, and cannot be considered as such solely because it receives medicare [sic]
and medicaid [sic] funds and is subject to state regulation”).
See Diagle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1349 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The existence of state regulation and the receipt of state funding, however, do not necessarily
create state action.”).
The Hill-Burton Act, passed by Congress in 1946, provided hospitals, nursing homes, and
other health facilities funding for construction and modernization in exchange for an
agreement to provide a reasonable volume of services to individuals unable to pay. While
the program stopped providing funds in 1997, approximately 200 health care facilities
nationwide must still provide free or reduced-cost care as a result of these grants. See HillBurton Free and Reduced Cost Health Care, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/hillburton/default.htm (providing additional background on the
implications of the Hill-Burton Act); see also Blumstein, supra note 231, at 1360–61 (discussing the implications of the federal government’s Hill-Burton construction program).
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Kottmyer v. Maas serves as an example of this judicial stance. In
Kottmyer, an infant was born with severe brain damage in a hospital
that was operating pursuant to licensing and authority of state and
249
federal governments. The infant’s parents alleged that the hospital
and a hospital social worker were state actors at the time the harm
250
occurred, and therefore subject to constitutional constraints. However, the court held that the fact that the hospital was operating pursuant to government licensing requirements did not establish that it
251
was a state actor.
Thus, the parents could not claim any constitu252
tional violation.
Similarly, in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, the Court found that there was no state action in
private insurers’ decisions to withhold payment pursuant to a state
regulatory scheme because the ultimate insurance decisions could
253
not be attributed to the state.
If the government uses comparative effectiveness research findings to guide its licensing restrictions, the cases examined in this section suggest that such use of CER results would not be unconstitutional. These cases also suggest that it is constitutionally permissible
for the government to infringe on access to health care treatment options, at least to a certain extent, through the use of licensing restrictions. Thus, the government may be successful in using licensing requirements to constrain health care practices and the actions of
private parties so as to conform with CER findings, even where government licensing requirements infringe to some extent on fundamental rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Comparative effectiveness research has emerged at the frontlines
of the health care debate as perhaps the most important component
254
It is beof the new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
249
250
251
252

253

254

See Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 2006) (describing the circumstances of
the daughter’s death).
See id. at 688 (indicating the parents’ argument for considering the hospital and its employees to be state actors).
See id. (holding that neither the hospital nor its employees should be considered state
actors).
See id. (indicating that the fact that the hospital and social worker operate pursuant to
government licensing requirements was insufficient to establish that their actions constituted state action).
See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58 (1999) (determining that “an insurer’s decision to withhold payment and seek utilization review of the reasonableness
and necessity of particular medical treatment is not fairly attributable to the State”).
See supra notes 7–8.
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lieved that new CER results will contribute substantially to the goal of
personalizing medicine by elucidating which health care treatment
options are safest and most effective for patients with varying genetic
makeup. CER also has the potential to help rein in escalating health
care costs. In the immediate future, CER can contribute to this goal
by affording private entities a wealth of safety and effectiveness information that can be plugged into their own cost-effectiveness ana255
lyses and utilized. At some point in the future, the U.S. government
may also seek to incorporate a cost-effectiveness component directly
into the comparative effectiveness research that it presently sponsors,
which could help wring further savings from our health care system.
While proponents of CER tout its ability to save money while ensuring safe and effective care, opponents argue its use will disincentivize innovation, allow government intrusion into patient-provider rela256
tionships, and signal the beginning of health care rationing.
This
Comment has examined whether government use of comparative effectiveness research findings to influence Americans’ access to various health care treatment options would be found constitutional by
the courts. This issue is of critical importance in light of the newly
passed health care reform legislation, which includes provisions focused on CER, and the funding cordoned off for CER in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. It is also important because
there remain strong opponents of CER who are likely to raise constitutional challenges to government efforts to utilize CER findings.
The discussion presented indicates that such opponents will have
very few constitutional claims on which to protect health services,
practices, facilities, and stakeholders from government decisions to
ban or restrict access to health care treatment options on the basis of
CER findings. However, some legal protections do exist if the government attempts to deny access to certain treatment options on the
basis of race or gender, and some protections for individuals on the
basis of age have been incorporated into the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. Yet overall, the conclusion that the government
will have fairly broad authority to utilize CER findings without fear of
constitutional challenge will undoubtedly be viewed by CER proponents as a major victory for health care reform.
This Comment has discussed how the government could attempt
to ban or restrict access to health treatment options on the basis of
255
256

See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing how comparative effectiveness research is expected to save money in the health care system).
See Keckley & Frink, supra note 50, at 73-78 (describing why some stakeholders oppose the
use of comparative effectiveness research).
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CER findings. While an outright government ban on certain health
treatment options may seem unlikely, imposition of Medicare or Medicaid restrictions on reimbursement for certain health treatment options deemed less safe or effective on the basis of comparative effectiveness research is a real possibility in the near future. For some
Americans, a restriction on coverage will effectively be a denial of
access. And it is of course critical to bear in mind that government
decisions about health care coverage will influence what private in257
surers are willing to cover.
In a country that values freedom of choice, the question remains
whether the American public will be ready for the government to exercise greater control over access to health care treatment options.
Given the massive impact that use of these findings could have on
access to various medical treatment options, the government may be
well-advised to consider whether additional protections surrounding
the use of CER findings are warranted. For instance, if certain medical treatment options can be identified as particularly valuable to or
desired by many Americans, such as mammograms for women under
258
age fifty, state or federal legislatures may wish to consider acting
preemptively to afford these treatment options special protections
through new legislation. While guidelines would need to be carefully
constructed to ensure that such a system is not abused and that it reflects important underlying policy goals, such a system could play an
important role in ensuring that the benefits of harnessing CER findings for health care decision making are maximized, while the potential harms are kept at bay.

257
258

Editorial, Is Newer Better? Not Always, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at WK10.
See Gina Kolata, Panel Urges Mammograms at 50, Not 40, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/17/health/17cancer.html (discussing the debate
over whether to heed new mammography guidelines as provided by the U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force).

